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ABSTRACT 
 
Money is a public good.  The regulation of its creation, supply and distribution is of national 
and international interest. Monetary stability is an important regulatory goal conducted 
through an interaction of economic, political, religious factors as well as legislative action. 
The state plays an intermediary role, bridging domestic interests and international interests. 
Increasing interdependence between national economic systems and international 
obligations sometimes leads to the manipulation of systems as well as currency wars. 
Regulation is done through co-operative international action since domestic regulators are no 
longer sufficiently equipped to do so. Resultantly, there is an emergence of new structural 
paradigms to deal with it. Meanwhile, states still enjoy certain residual competences of 
sovereignty. Numerous legal factors act as constraints on sovereignty with far reaching 
implications on states’ regulatory space. In light of the divergence of regulatory objectives, 
there is an apparent need to balance municipal with international interests on the regulation 
of the monetary system. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY AS AN ESTABLISHED RIGHT OF A STATE 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The role of the state in the minting and coinage of currency is an age old tradition among 
states. National legislation defines legal tender, determines what chattels constitute money 
and also determines the monetary standard upon which that money is to be based. This 
power of the state to define money is the basis for the dominance of the state theory of 
money. Other theories such as social and institutional origions of money also seem to have 
gained popularity in recent times.1 As monetary systems have evolved from commodity 
based standards such as precious metals to fiat standards, the monetary power of the state 
has become even more apparent. 
Monetary sovereignty2 still remains an important attribute of statehood as the state occupies 
a relatively unlimited position regarding the formulation of monetary law and policies. It is 
noteworthy, however, that this type of sovereignty stems from the general sovereignty of the 
state, an attribute which assigns exclusive control to a particular state to determine matters 
within a particular territory.3 Mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty is the basis of 
international co-operation between states. Although international co-operation is based on a 
number of principles, that of “sovereign equality” of nations4 plays a highly important function. 
It is the first to be stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, an indication that its 
significance is highly regarded in international law. 
The application of the principle of ‘sovereign equality” of nations creates a complex scenario, 
particularly with regards to questions on how national interests are to be balanced with the 
demands steming from a state’s international legal obligations. There is no other area in 
                                            
1
 Proctor C Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money 7
th
 Edition 2012 at 40 notes that a strict adherence to 
the state theory of money is no longer tenable as there now exist institutional and other forms of 
money. 
2
 Treves T “Monetary Sovereignty Today” in Giovanoli M (ed) International Monetary Law: Issues for 
the New Millenium 2000 at 111-118. Treves perceives monetary sovereignty as inclusive of the power 
to define a monetary unit, to define notes and coins in multiples of that unit and to require that 
payments in such notes and coins be accepted as legal tender at nominal value. 
3
 Jackson JH “Sovereignty:Outdated Concept or New Approaches” in Shan W, Simmons P and Singh 
D (eds) Redefining Sovereignty in International Economic Law 2008 at 10  says that in light of the 
recent developments in international relations, the state no longer wields exclusive power which 
traditionally would include the power to chop off heads or to even violate virgins. 
4
 See Article 2(1) of UN charter  and Article 4 of the SADC Charter which deal with principles. The 
latter reads; SADC and its Members shall act  in accordance with the following princples: a) sovereign 
equlaity of all Members States. 
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which upholding national sovereign prerogatives openly clashes with the principle of free 
trade than in the area of monetary law. States do sometimes enact legislation which is 
adverse to the interests of foreign individuals. 
By virtue of the above stated facts, the powers and responsibilities of the state entity are of 
great interest to one attempting to obtain an indepth understanding of public international law 
of money. As the bearer of sovereign power regarding money, the state enjoys a priviledged 
international law position which makes the regulation of its conduct somehow problematic. 
Understanding the functional role of national sovereignty within the legal order is a necessary 
requirement for the proper appreciation of the legal matters pertinent to cross border trade, 
investment and other economic activities. While a state’s exercise of political sovereignty 
rarely raises problematic questions except in cases of excessive abuse of such power, the 
exercise of sovereignty with regards to monetary power does from time to time give rise to 
critical questions that tend to have far reaching implications on international economic 
relations. 
As monetary sovereignty is a public international law principle which basically means that 
every state has the right to determine its own monetary matters within its territory5, disputes 
surrounding the implications of its application have been brought for adjudication before both 
domestic6 and international courts7 and tribunals. The reasoning of the courts in these cases 
seems to indicate that monetary sovereignty is an established right in international law.8 Be 
that as it may, a unilateral exercise of such state power still gives rise to conditions that make 
the pursuit of international economic activities difficult. 
 
1.2. CURRENT CONCERNS REGARDING MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY 
One of the areas of great importance in international economic law is the interconnection 
between the monetary systems and other economic activities of states. While monetary 
sovereignty is an important attribute of statehood, it currently stands in jeopardy in light of the 
increasing inclination towards globalisation. To uphold and defend it is to overthrow the 
pillars of modern economic relations. Payment for goods purchased would become 
impossible if states were to unilaterally impose and adhere to rigid exchange controls and 
                                            
5
 Mann FA The Legal Aspect of Money  5
th
  Edition 1992 at 461. 
6
 Norman v Baltimore & 0hio Railroad., 294 US 240 (1935). 
7
 France v Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes Judgment, (1929) PCIJ Series A no 20, ICGJ 
260 (PCIJ 1929), 12th July 1929, Permanent Court of International Justice and France v Brazil 
Judgment, (1929) PCIJ Series A no 21, ICGJ 261 (PCIJ 1929), 12th July 1929, Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ). 
8
 Ibid. 
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restriction policies as they please. No wonder, in an effort to prevent states from arbitrarily 
imposing restrictions on certain monetary transactions, Article VII (3)b of the IMF is designed 
to limit the member states’ powers to impose any controls unless the adoption of such 
controls is done in pursuance of formal declarations (made after a properly conducted 
investigation) of the scarcity of the currency of the state concerned.9 
For the sake of promoting free international enterprise,  municipal monetary laws  must of 
necessity be bought into conformity with the demands of international economic interaction 
so as to inspire the development of complimentary relationships among states. Unilateral 
state action is often characterised by protectionist measures which create numerous 
problems for cross-border economic interaction. Adoption of the “race to the bottom”10 
strategies, competitive depreciation as well as exchange rate manipulation often lead to 
friction among states as is apparent in the case of the US-Sino relations. It is alleged that the 
People’s Republic of China engages in deliberate currency manipulations through 
maintaining an undervalued Renminbi (RMB), the official currency of China, whose unit is the 
Yuan, against the US Dollar. This has led to a “currency war”11 and  a diplomatic tension 
between the USA and China in recent years. The latter has been accused of adopting 
monetary policies that allegedly exert undue pressure on the US economy.12 In light of the 
emergent “competitive regulation”13 whereby states attempt to exploit loopholes in other 
states’ regulatory systems for their own advantage, it turns out that co-operation remains the 
best option in order for international economic interaction to be mutually enriching. 
                                            
9
 See IMF Article VII:3(b) which deals with the issue of exchange controls. 
10
 See Jackson JH “Global Economics and International Economic Law” (1998) 1 Journal of 
International Economic Law 1-23 at 22 who notes that governments do sometimes set lower standards 
of regulation so as to attract economic activity in their own societies. For example, a lower tax rate for 
businesses makes it more attractive to invest in that country than investing in states where taxes are 
high. 
11
 Copelovitch MS & Pevehouse JC “Currency Wars by other Means: Exchange Rates and 
GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation” (2011) University of of Wisconsin, Department of Political Science, 
Working Paper (Unpublished). Available at  
https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2010/papers/F220_paper3.pdf . Last accessed on 14 January 2015. 
See also Cline WR and Williamson J (2010) “Currency Wars?” Peterson Institute for International 
Economics Policy Brief Number PB 10 - 26  at 5 who acknowledge the existence of the war and 
explain why “… many countries, especially those not fully developed, desire to protect their export 
sector …” Some states, including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Thailand seem to participate in some 
kind of exchange market interventions. 
12
 Jung H “Tackling Currency Manipulation with International Law: Why and How Currency 
Manipulation should be Adjudicated?” (2012)  9 (2) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 
184-200. 
13
 Jackson J H “Global Economics and International Economic Law” (1998) 1 Journal of International 
Economic Law  at 14. Also Trachtman JP “Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction” (2000) 
Journal of International Economic Law 331-348 at 339. 
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One other subject that has generated great attention concerns the liberalisation of capital 
movements.14 While states have the competence to determine the external value of their 
currencies through the development of exchange rate policies, the power of a state to 
regulate money outside its borders remains a tricky matter. The growth of global financial 
markets and the emergence of offshore markets have made the task even more 
cumbersome. In the words of Cohen, 
“The functional domain of each money no longer corresponds precisely to the 
formal jurisdiction of its issuing authority. Currencies have become increasingly 
deterritorialized, their circulation determined not by law or politics but by the 
preferences of market agents.15  
In light of the above, Jackson is not far from the truth when he notes that “the actual 
circumstances of the “globalized market” impose realistic constraints on the unilateral 
exercise of “sovereignty.”16  The Brettonwoods monetary system operated with the effect of 
stabilising the global monetary system. Its collapse on 15 August 197117 resulted in the 
adoption of floating exchange arrangements thereby compromising the desired stability. As 
manipulative state conduct became the order of the day, some states began to maintain 
artficially undervalued currencies with the attendant effect of distorted trade balances.  
The problem is further compounded by the fact that sovereign decisions in one state usually 
have adverse consequences outside its own boundaries. An unfettered right of monetary 
sovereignty is no longer justifiable in an open globalised market but rather runs contrary to 
the objectives of free trade and capital liberalisation.18 In light of the crystalisation of trends 
towards globalisation and mounting tension between national sovereignty on one hand and 
                                            
14
 Pasini FL “Movement of Capital and Trade in Services and Trade: Distinguishing Myth from Reality 
Regarding the GATS and the Liberalization of the Capital Account” (2012) 15 (2)  Journal of 
International Economic Law 581-619. Viterbo A “Iceland’s capital controls and the constraints imposed 
by the EEA agreement” (2011) Capital Markets Law Journal, 214-237 at 216. In 2008, Iceland 
introduced exchange restrictions in order to curb the flight of capital which was caused by the stress 
suffered by the Icelandic economy. 
15
 Cohen BJ “The international Monetary System: Diffusion and Ambiguity” (2008) 84 (3) International 
Affairs  at 455–470 at 463. 
16
 Jackson JH “International Economic Law: Reflections on the Boileroom of International Relations” 
(1995) 10 (2) American University International Law Review 595-606 at 604. 
17
 Lowenfield A F “The International Monetary System” (2010) 13 (3) Journal of International Economic 
Law 575-595 at 581. 
18
 Article VI of the IMF which deals with purposes and aims of the organisation. Article XV of the GATT 
regulates exchange and trade measures by which states may frustrate GATT and IMF objectives 
respectively. 
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international trade objectives on the other,19 the imposition of constraints on monetary 
sovereignty almost becomes compulsory. 
Articles IV and VIII of the IMF, Article XV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and Article XII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are very 
significant in  regulating international economic activities. The extent to which these 
provisions constrain abitrariness in the formulation of sovereign decisions is, however, far 
from clear. There are other numerous instruments that are relevant in this regard. These 
include those from regional systems such as the European Monetary Union (EMU). The 
treaty establishing the European Communities as amended by the Maastricht Treaty20 is an 
important regulatory regime from which guidance may be obtained as the need arises21 in the 
regulation of monetary matters. 
Since money is so central to trade between states22, a legal framework that protects the 
monetary rights of participants in international commerce is imperative. The three dimensions 
to the economic relations between states namely trade, money and investment play a pivotal 
role in shaping interstate relations.23 However, money plays the key role of a facilitator of 
trade in goods, trade in services, and foreign direct investments. Its central function in 
international commerce has been recognised by Booysen who refers to it as “one of the 
cornerstones of International trade law.”24 
 
The following statement echoes the importance of a harmonised monetary system.  
“Because a country cannot alter its international payments position without 
automatically causing an opposite change of equal magnitude in the payment 
positions of the rest of the world, one country’s pursuit of its macro-economic 
goals inevitably influences how well other countries attain their goals.”25 
States therefore need to co-operate in the formulation of monetary law so as to stabilise the 
international monetary system. 
 
                                            
19
 Bagwell K and Staiger RW “National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World.” (2004) National 
Bureau of Economic Research Paper Series 10249  at 1. 
20
 The treaty regulates the restrictions on capital movements between EMU members and third states. 
Article 73(b) deals with the prohibition of capital movements between states. It is a tenable submission 
that a prohibition on the restrictions of capital movements is in itself a constraint on the sovereignty of 
the state to deal with capital movements into and out of its territory. 
21
 Booysen H “The Monetary Constitution of the Future Euro and its International Effect” (1996) 29 (2) 
The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 112-129 at 118. 
22
 Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña “Legal consequences of a single currency” in Giovanoli M (ed) 
International law: Issues for the New Millenium 2000 at 161. 
23
 Lastra RM Legal foundations of International Monetary Stability 2006  at 346. 
24
 Booysen H Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System 2003 at 318. 
25
 Krugman PR and Obstfeld M. International Economics; Theory and Policy 2006 at 487. 
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1.3. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY CO-OPERATION 
Due to the apparent importance of economic interaction, states have drifted closer towards 
monetary co-operation in recent decades.26 As already mentioned above, the IMF has been 
functional in this arena since the ratification of its charter in 1945. Other initiatives have also 
been adopted, leading to the emergence of monetary unions, amid calls for the creation of a 
more harmonised international monetary and financial architecture.27 All these efforts are 
designed to usher in a measure of certainty in international monetary law for the sake of the 
protection of trade and other public goods.28 The EMU has also integrated national 
currencies in a manner that has had a dramatic impact on global monetary relations while the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) has launched a regional integration 
strategy and the agenda for the formation of a monetary union.29 It can be argued that these 
initiatives stem from a realisation that exclusive municipal control of monetary law is no 
longer compatible with the current developments in international commerce. Inevitably, the 
sovereign monetary powers of states have undergone curtailment. States have surrendered 
some of the attributes of their power through participation in treaty regimes such as the 
IMF,30 the EMU, and other monetary unions. 
 
1.4. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTRAINTS ON MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY 
States sometimes undertake certain acts in violation of international law. Examples of such 
acts are the manipulation of exchange rates and the imposition of exchange restrictions 
contrary to IMF Articles. They do this in order “to gain unfair competitive advantage over 
other states”31 and such action is an affront to international law particularly if undertaken in 
violation of treaty obligations. Market intervention strategies that violate international 
obligations cause a serious disruption of cross border economic activities. 
 
                                            
26
 The EMU has emerged as a leading example of regional monetary co-operation creating a single 
currency since 1999. Its performance has seen mixed outcomes. Lauded as an intelligent innovation 
at its birth, the first one and a half decades of its existence have raised more questions than answers 
with regards the feasibility of a universal currency. 
27
 Giovanoli M (ed) “A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects of International 
Financial Standard Setting” in Giovanoli M International Monetary Law: Issues for the New Millenium 
2000 3-59 at 4. 
28
 Viterbo A International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to State Sovereignty and 
Dispute Settlement 2012  at 10. 
29
 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan Desk Assessment 2005 – 2010 Report 
November 2011 at 29 refers to plans for a regional Monetary Union by 2016 and an Economic Union, 
with a single currency by 2018. 
30
 IMF Article VIII (2) deals with “Avoidance of restrictions on current payments.” It further reads; (a) 
Subject to the provisions of Article VII:3(b) and Article XIV:2, no member shall, without the approval of 
the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international 
transactions.” 
31
 Gold J Legal Effects of Fluctuating Exchange Rates 1990 at 10. 
7 
 
University of South Africa 2015 
Constraints on sovereignty assume factual as well as legal dimensions32. Factual constraints 
occur mostly due to concessions and co-operation based on political considerations, market 
changes as well as trade usages. Legal constraints, on the other hand, are different from 
factual ones. Unlike the constraints which emanate from political factors, economic 
developments and market forces in operation,33 legal or juridical constraints occur in terms of 
state law, international law obligations that come about in terms of multilateral or bilateral 
agreements or in terms of customary public international law norms. The sovereign state has 
legally ceded some of its traditional elements of control to other role players such as the 
international organisations.34 
 
The rate of the de jure  shift of monetary power from the state to international organisations 
has however been slower than that of the de facto shift of power due to political and 
economic factors. Factually, the state is no longer able to keep pace with all activities 
connected with its currency35 and yet the law does not fully address the mismatch. 
Juridical constraints are important in that they force each state to operate in terms of 
international expectations instead of pursuing selfish and protectionist policies. They 
constrain the power of the state and ensure legal protection for the benefit of other parties. 
 
1.5. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
This work is broken down into six chapters as outlined below. 
 
Now that the introductory work has been covered in this chapter, chapter 2 considers the 
conduct of the state in the exercise of its monetary sovereignty including how state power is 
occasionally wielded in a manner that is adverse to the interests of other states and private 
parties.   
                                            
32
 Lastra RM Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability 2006 at 26. Also Jackson JH 
“Sovereignty:Outdated concept or New Approaches” in Shan W, Simmons P and Singh D (eds) 
Redefining Sovereignty in International Economic Law 2008 at 10. Jackson writes that the sovereignty 
debate refers to the allocation of power, particularly government legal decision-making power. 
33 
Zimmermann CD “The Concept of Monetary Sovereignty Revisited” (2013) 24 Journal of 
International Economic Law 797–818 at 800 suggests that there are “factual constraints brought about 
by economic globalization and the increasing integration of financial markets…” 
34
 Multilateral legal regimes such as the IMFsystem, have usurped some of the powers traditionally 
reserved for the state. In terms of Article IV:2 (a) of the IMF a member state must notify the 
organisation of its intention to adjust its exchange arrangements. Bilateral Investment Treaties also do 
sometimes contain clauses that limit the powers of the state as far as monetary sovereignty is 
concerned. 
35
 Cohen BJ “The international monetary system: Diffusion and Ambiguity” (2008) 84 (3) International 
Affairs. at 455–470 at 463. 
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In chapter 3, an appraisal of the theoretical matters regarding monetary sovereignty is given 
elaboration. Its contours and scope are discussed in the section of the work which also 
unveils the effects of these incidences on international law. An exploration is made of the law 
regarding exchange rate determination, exchange controls and capital controls and how they 
are being employed in the contemporary monetary system. It also discusses the 
complimentary relationship between national and international legal instruments.  
 
In chapter 4, the reasons and methods of constraining state power are given attention and 
the chapter also examines the effects of the IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and regional agreement provisions on the monetary 
power of the state. The application of legal provisions that constrain monetary sovereignty is 
also discussed.  
 
In chapter 5, the study focuses on the implications that the constraints on monetary 
sovereignty have on the broader body of international law. It also explores the effects of the 
constraints on the application of international economic law. It explores concrete examples of 
factual situations in which monetary sovereignty has openly clashed with other legally 
protectable interests as well as some tentative solutions to these clashes. 
 
Chapter 6 deals with the concluding remarks, assesses the extent of the legal constraints 
that are applicable to monetary sovereignty, and also makes relevant recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. THE CONDUCT OF STATE IN MONETARY MATTERS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
There have been some changes in state’s role of regulating monetary law in recent decades. 
This chapter explores those changes and the responses that have been adopted to address 
them. The position of the state as the centre for monetary regulation in international 
monetary law continues to be questioned. Yet in spite of the assaults on  its dominance, the 
state’s position still remains central and pivotal. An adaptation to the resultant changes has 
tended to tour various routes, none of which has brought about any fundamental changes to 
the monetary system.  
This chapter begins by exploring the concept of global monetary stability in light of the theory 
of ‘global public goods.’ The  theory originates from the economic sciences discipline but has 
in recent years found its way into the legal discipline. It has been useful in enhancing an 
understanding of the policy choices of states and also to bridge the conceptual gap between 
the disciplines of law and economics. Building upon the assumption that the law does not 
regulate in a vacuum, but rather enjoys a complimentary relationship with rules of 
economics, monetary law is placed in context as an interdependent public good the 
regulation of which imports the imperative of international co-operation.  An enquiry is then 
made into the applicability of the classical Westphalian perceptions of international law under 
the present circumstances of globalisation. These perceptions refer to a prohibition36 on the 
conduct of states that international law; 
 “leaves them [states] in … a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in 
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every state remains 
free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”37  
The public choices at the disposal of the international community receive attention and are 
evaluated in terms of how they can best be exercised in the design of the most effective 
system.  
                                            
36
 The Westphalian model of international law, as explained in the Case of the SS ‘Lotus’ (France V 
Turkey)  Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice Series A.-No. 70 September 7th, 
1927 at 18 holds that the state “may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. 
In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory 
except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.”  
37
 Id. at 20. See also Jackson J H “Sovereignty: Outdated Concept or New Approaches” Shan W, 
Simmons P and Singh D Redefining Sovereignty in International Law 2008 at 8-9. 
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The chapter also exposes the abuses of power that have come about as a result of the 
unqualified and slavish application of the Westphalian model of international law. The next 
step is a discussion of how Westphalian regulatory models are out of step with the current 
maze of interstate relations and patterns of international economic interaction. An exploration 
of some emergent ‘structural paradigms’ of international economic law also comes in tandem 
as do the evaluations of the foundational principles upon which a legitimate international 
monetary system may be built. These various paradigms are examined for their merits 
together with the prevailing criticisms against each one of them. In conclusion, the chapter 
cites the apparent strengths and weaknesses of the paradigms explored. 
 
2.2. MONETARY STABILITY AS A ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD’ 
A stable monetary system is an essential ingredient for any economic system. It has been 
argued that “… a stable currency is one of our most valuable public goods, comparable to 
well-functioning systems of law, public order or public finance and taxation.”38 Currency is an 
intergral part of the monetary system and it plays a very important function of facilitating 
economic activities. The stability of the global monetary system translates to international 
economic stability, a condition that has been elusive in recent years.39 The central function 
that money plays in economic activities makes the regulation of its supply and provision very 
important. Monetary stabillity is a global monetary good the supply of which is beneficial to all 
those involved in the global economic system. Questions therefore arise regarding who 
should regulate the supply of this all important public good. Should regulation take place at 
the level of the state or at international law level? The public choices that have to be made in 
respect of this question must take into account numerous considerations some of which are 
discussed below. 
                                            
38
 Baltensperger E & Cottier T “The Role of the International Law in Monetary Affairs” (2010) 13 (3) 
Journal of International Economic Law 911–937 at 911. 
39
 As recently as 2007, a gobal financial crisis with far reaching effects affected financial systems of 
almost all the states. It began in the last quarter of 2007. What may have begun as the  burst of the 
housing mortgage bubble in the USA soon spread into other financial centres and led to a solvency / 
capital  crisis and a subsequent run by financial institutions on other financial institutions. The effect 
was felt right across the global economic spectrum, affecting the economic activities of many nations. 
States adopted various responses to the crisis some of which generated more problems. The bail out 
strategies on the Too Big To Fail (TBTF) institutions were adopted and this method exacebated the 
problem in that it resulted in a snowballing sovereign debt. By the year 2014, some European nations 
such as Greece and Italy were still sitting with huge and menacing sovereign debts. Rickards J 
Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis 2011 at 114. Stiglitz JE “Too Big to Fail Banks” 
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Available at  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EV2Pn6gMhVQ (Accessed on 15 February 2015). See also 
Petersmann EU “JIEL Debate: Methodological Pluralism and its Criticism in International Economic 
Law Research” (2012) 15 (4) Journal of International Economic Law 921-970 at 951. Lastra RM & 
Wood G “The Crisis of 2007–09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions” (2010 13(3) Journal of International 
Economic Law 531–550. 
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In order to fully appreciate the importance of global monetary stability, it is very important to 
place it within the framework of ‘global public goods’ and then to define what 'global public 
goods’ are. One definition states that “Transnational public goods are those with benefits and 
costs that reach beyond one country and in some cases beyond one generation.”40 
Trachtman indicates that they are goods that are “non-excludable and non-rival.”41 Goods are 
said to be ‘non-rival’ when their consumption by one person  does not diminish the ability of 
others to also enjoy the same benefit. The term ‘non-excludable’ means that those paying for 
the supply of the good “cannot keep a non-payer from consuming the good's benefits.”42 The 
systemic importance of monetary stability as well as the risk of contagion import upon its 
regulation an imperative of international co-operation. 
Given that there are different types of global public goods, the methods used to supply each 
type have to accord with the nature of each good in question. The ‘single effort global public 
goods’ such as scientific inventions do not require the co-operation of all the nations but only 
the effort of those directly involved, while the ‘weakest link goods’ such as prevention of the 
spread of diseases require the collective action of all states so as to effectively control 
epidemics. There are also what are called ‘interdependent aggregate global public goods’ 
whose supply requires collective action to effectively and efficiently supply them. Such goods 
are ‘interdependent’ in nature in that what happens in one state has an effect on other states. 
The goods have an ‘aggregate’ nature in that their supply requires the collective participation 
of all the states.43 
Global monetary stability is one of the “interdependent aggregate public goods”44  the supply 
of which invites ‘collective action’ of all states and Petersmann states that these goods are 
best supplied by a ‘summation process’45 of numerous institutions and levels. The 
globalisation of markets accounts for the transformation of what used to be national goods 
into global public goods.46 This observation casts a dark shadow over the validity of the obiter 
                                            
40
 Sandler T “Assessing the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: In Search of the Holy Grail” in  Kaul I & 
Conceiçāo P Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization 2006 at 131. Sandler goes on to 
add concerning this type of goods that “If this reach is worldwide, the goods are global public goods.” 
41
 Trachtman JP “The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and 
Cooperation” (2010) 13 (3) Journal of International Economic Law) 719–742 at 721. 
42
 Sandler T “Assessing the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: In Search of the Holy Grail” in  Kaul I & 
Conceiçāo P Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization 2006 at 132. 
43
 Petersmann EU “JIEL Debate: Methodological Pluralism and its Critics in International Law 
Research” (2012) 15 (4) Journal of International Economic Law  921-970 at  930. The author gives an 
enlightened exposition of the various types of ‘global public goods’ as well as the mode of supply of 
the goods in a discourse that lays a solid foundation for the ‘Multi-level governance’ of ‘interdependent 
aggregate global goods.’ The elegant discourse shows how what he terms the summation process is 
the most appropriate method of governing the global monetary system. 
44
 Petersmann EU supra at 932. 
45
 Petersmann EU supra at 950. 
46
 Petersmann EU supra at 947. 
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made by the Court of International Justice on the Serbian loans case in 192947 to the effect 
that monetary sovereignty is an unchalleged given. A lot has changed since the court ruling. 
Closer market intergration means that national economies no longer operate with the same 
degree of autonomy which they had in 1929. How then can the contours of monetary 
sovereignty as they stood in 1929 remain the same after eight decades? The law certainly 
needs to adapt to the developments that occur across the various sectors of society. The 
‘horizontal and vertical dependencies’  of nations and institutions make it “highly impossible 
for one state to effectively regulate the supply of such goods.48 The ‘jurisdictional 
exclusivity’49 of yesteryears certainly needs to give way to ‘inclusivity’. 
The co-operation of all states, particularly those with vastly sized economies of systemically 
significant stature, is an imperative of the modern international monetary legal system. This 
is the most effective way to temper the adverse effects of the negative externalities50 of 
national economic policies. The negative spillovers, that have potential to cause global 
instability can best be avoided through co-operation in monetary regulation. In light of this, 
the state law must no longer be isolated but rather must be woven into the fabric of the 
international legal system in such a way as to facilitate co-operative action in the search for 
solutions to cross-border problems. Co-operation and removal of information assymetries are 
the prerequisites for proactive action. 
 
2.3. REGULATORY BURDENS UPON THE STATE 
The state has numerous responsibilities towards its citizens as well as other states. One of 
its paramount responsibilities is to govern the territory as effectively as it possibly can. It has 
to ensure the welfare of its constituents who otherwise have the corresponding right to 
demand political, social and economic stability,  as well as peace and security.  
The decisions of the state are informed by a combination of economic, political, ideological 
and religious considerations. The forces from these spheres of a nation’s life determine the 
policy choices of the state as well as how these factors are employed to achieve the desired 
                                            
47
 France v Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes Judgment, (1929) PCIJ Series A no 20, ICGJ 
260 (PCIJ 1929), 12th July 1929, Permanent Court of International Justice and France v Brazil 
Judgment, (1929) PCIJ Series A no 21, ICGJ 261 (PCIJ 1929), 12th July 1929, Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ). 
48
 Petersmann EU  “JIEL Debate: Methodological Pluralism and its Critics in International Law 
Research” (2012) 15 (4) Journal of International Economic Law 921-970 at 947. 
49
 Jurisdictional exclusivity refers to the jurisdiction priviledge of a state to regulate within its territory 
without interference from outside forces. 
50
 Joel Trachtman “The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation 
and Cooperation” (2010) 13 (3) Journal of International Economic Law at 721-722. 
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objectives. Domestic political considerations51 play a decisive function in shaping these 
choices as does “… a country’s level of economic development ..[…]…capacity and desire to 
adopt and maintain particular monetary regimes.”52 States sometimes place a high premium 
on nationalism. Russel observes how nationalistic governments are less inclined to intergrate 
themselves into the international economic system53 due to their inclination towards 
protection of patriotic agendas. 
Considering that the state formulates monetary law, its role in defining money remains a 
matter of great significance. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the 
disppearance of commodity standards, almost all national currencies are of a non-convertible 
nature based on ‘fiat’ rather than commodity standards. Until then, currencies were 
convertible in the sense that bank notes could be redeemed for specie or a commodity of 
appropriate value. Gold and silver were the popular monetary commodities but have since 
been demonetised. Nowadays each currency obtains its legal status from the authority of the 
one issuing the it. The word ‘fiat’54 means ‘decree’ or ‘proclamation.’ It is the power of 
proclamation by a state which gives monetary character to the paper. There is absolutely 
nothing of intrinsic value in the paper that could for instance give greater value to a Pound 
Sterling as compared to the US dollar. Neither, comparing the US$1 with a US$10, is there 
any unique and perculiar intrinsic quality in one paper granting it more value than the other. 
Instead, the quality and the size of the paper may be the same such that only the figure 
super-scribed on the face of each note serves as the distinguishing factor.  
The state pursues the goal of sustaining the internal and the external value of the currency. A 
crucial factor regarding the value of the currency is the national economic policies of the 
issuing state. Sound economic policies have a tendency to secure stability whilst unsound 
policies lead to the opposite result. The value of money is at the heart of economic stability, 
which happens to be one of the basic requirements for the security of any state. When a 
country’s economy fails to guarantee economic security for its citizens, this may result in 
widespread social unrest or even a political revolution.55 The state pursues macro-economic 
                                            
51
 Russel J “Trading Sovereignty for Stability? The Political Economy of Monetary Intergration” (2011) 
37 Review of International Studies 673-690 at 674. 
52
 Id  at 681. 
53
 Id  at 681. 
54
 Knapp GF The State Theory of Money 1924 at 30. Validity is assigned to money by means of a 
‘proclamation’ by the authorities of the state. Value is not intrinsic on the substance that makes the 
money but is derived from the proclamation or  the decree made. See also Acocella N Economic 
Policy in The Age of Globalisation 2005 footnote 9 at 254. 
55
 The Arab spring that swept across North Africa as from 2011 was triggered by economic hardships 
under a dictatorship. Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor in Tunisia doused himself with fuel and set 
himself on fire in front of a governement building. The incident sparked a series of revolts which 
subsequently led to the ousting of the head of state in Tunisia and inspired revolutions in Egypt, 
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stability with unremitting vehemence as a way of preserving its sovereign status. It meets 
these obligations through the maintainance of a balance of payment equilibrium, exchange 
rate stability as well as price stability. It employs many other monetary policy instruments in 
order to achieve its goals.  
The goal of price stability has in recent years emerged as one of the priority monetary 
stability goals among many states56 and this goal also finds expression both in national as 
well as international legal instruments. An example of a national legal instrument that cites 
price stability as a monetary policy goal is the Bank of England Act of 1998. It reads;  
“In relation to monetary policy, the objectives of the Bank of England shall be (a) 
to maintain price stability, and (b) … to support the economic policy of Her 
Majesty's Government, including its objectives for growth and employment.57 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is a highly significant 
international legal instrument espousing the goal of price stability. Article 127 of TFEU 
stipulates that ‘The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks … (ESCB) 
shall be to maintain price stability” and to “… support the general economic policies in the 
Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union …”58  
The South African Reserve Bank59 also strongly pursues the goal of monetary stability. 
National legislation is invariably employed as a tool in the furtherance of the broader agenda 
of economic stability. It appears to have become a prevalent assumption that price stability is 
an important policy goal to be pursued by the members of the EMU. Monetary stability refers 
to “the absence of erratic or unanticipated movements in the level of prices through inflation 
or through deflation.”60 
States sometimes maintain monetary stability by controlling inflation. Care needs be 
exercised in the use of instruments designed to control inflation. A slavish pursuit of stability 
in the goods prices has in some instances resulted in a complete overshadowing of the 
                                                                                                                                        
Yemen and Libya. http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1753077/Mohamed-Bouazizi 
Accessed on 09 November 2014. 
56
 Lastra RM Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability 2006 at 35. 
57
 Section 11 of the Bank of England Act 1998. 
58
 Article 127  of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
59
 South African Reserve Bank  website reads “The primary objective of monetary policy in South 
Africa is to achieve and maintain price stability in the interest of sustainable and balanced economic 
development and growth.” Price stability reduces uncertainty in the economy and, therefore, provides 
a favourable environment for growth and employment creation. Available at  
http://www.resbank.co.za/MonetaryPolicy/Pages/MonetaryPolicy-Home.aspx (Accessed on 09 
November 2014). 
60
 Lastra RM Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability 2006 at 36. 
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debilitating market behaviour regarding the financial asset markets.61 The adoption of 
inflation targets becomes a potentially distabilising factor unless there is a rational 
harmonisation of inflation indeces between those that are based on price adjustments for 
consumer goods and those based on asset price adjustments.62 
As is apparent from the discussion above, the goal of monetary stability is met through the 
employment of numerous economic instruments, principles and policies, an exercise which 
requires a high degree of skill. Monetary economics, a branch of economics dealing with 
matters such as the supply, quantity of money, the relationships between money and growth 
and between money and employment plays a highly influential function in influencing the 
choice and the deployment of these intruments. Law as a discipline is neither competent nor 
sufficiently equipped to prescribe the choice of these instruments. The ideas of economists 
do sometimes find their way into the law63 though it remains clear that law-making is not 
simply an enactment of economic theory into law. This remains so in spite of the fact that 
law-making does substantially leans on assumptions and commonly held notions of 
economic theory. 
The Keynesian theory64 dominated economic thinking for many years such that even 
legislators were informed in their reasoning by the dominant thoughts of the day. The 
adoption of the gold standard by England in the 19th century and the demonetisation of silver 
were directly attributable to the ideas of the British economist Ricardo65. His arguments in the 
years preceding the adoption of the gold standard in 1821 clearly pointed towards the 
economic importance of gold. Because legislators are not necessarily economists, they may 
                                            
61
 Stiglitz JE The Stiglitz Report:Reforming The International Monetary and Financial Systems in the 
Wake of the Global Crisis 2010 at 38. According to the report, the inflation indeces used were based 
on consumer goods and overlooked the price adjustments regarding other asssts. 
62
 Lastra RM supra at 35-36. 
63
 The Washington Consensus exercised a great deal of influence on monetary and financial law 
formulated after 1989. Begining with the paper by Williamson J who coined the phrase, the neo-liberal 
principles of market fundamentalism gained popularity. See Stiglitz JE The Stiglitz Report:Reforming 
The International Monetary and Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis 2010 at 21 and 59 
who notes that these ideas were very influential in promoting non-regulation of the financial markets. 
Such non-regulation, based on the assumptions that markets have an innate ability to self-correct 
were responsible for the global crisis that began in 2007. See also Sornarajah M “The Neo-Liberal 
Agenda in Investment: Its Rise, Retreat and Impact on State Sovereignty” in Shan W, Simmons P and 
Singh D Redefining Sovereignty in International Law 2008 at 199. 
64
 The Keynesian theory, an expression of the ideas of John M Keynes was based on the assumptions 
of the efficacy of closer and stronger state intervention in the economy through guidelines and 
financing of public projects. The ‘General theory’, as it was called, emphasised the role of the state  in 
fixing macro-economic behaviour of the essential variables such as interest rates as well as supply 
and demand for money through systematic interventions. Monetary and fiscal policies were viewed as 
important factors in the overal performance of the economy. Refer to Cord R Reintepreting the 
Keynesian Revolution 2013 at 6.  See also Blinder AS “Keynesian Economics” in The Concise 
Encyclopedia of Economics http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html Accessed on 
17 July 2014. 
65
 Friedman M Money Mischief; Episodes in Monetary History 1994 at 152-154. 
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be influenced by the dominant economic views. In the post-1960s  period, the quantity theory 
of money became very influential following the writings of a prominent economist of the time, 
Friedman.66 
The monetary economics discipline thus seems to occupy a very central function in 
prescribing the course for monetary legislation. Stiglitz and Greenwald opine that: 
“A central reason for interest in monetary theory is that monetary policy remains 
one of the most effective means by which the government can control the level of 
the economy's activity, at least at certain times.”67 
The state is more than willing in most cases, therefore, to resort to prevailing eceonomic 
principles and to enact laws that promote what is believed to be sound economic theory. It is 
economic theory that defines what stability is as well as the required circumstances in which 
growth and employment may best be achieved. The choice and the deployment of 
appropriate policy instruments therefore belongs in the province of economics rather than 
law. 
The state also finds itself saddled with an unenviable duty to prevent systemic failure of the 
financial sector as a way to ensure stability of the macro-economic environment. By virture of 
the inter-connection among institutions, the soundness of each institution is a matter that the 
state pursues with uncompromised diligence. A state may employ austerity measures during 
episodes of economic hardships so as to mitigate the effects of instability. It is significant to 
note that the focus of the law differs greatly from the pre-occupations of economics and 
politics. The law deals with the regulation of human and economic relations. Its focus is on 
rights and obligations. Legal subjects incur rights and obligations by their conduct. Economic 
relations and processes may benefit from the observance of these rights and obligations. It is 
important at the same time to note that legal objectives go beyond the mere facilitation of 
economic efficacy. Economic theory on the other hand is concerned with the efficacy of 
economic activity, the efficiency of markets, factors influencing outputs as well as the 
employment of the factors of production. 
The choices that the state makes regarding its monetary law are also influenced by the 
prevailing ideological considerations. When communism took a hold of Russia, the state 
adopted state-centred economic polices which did not give room to private enterprise. The 
                                            
66
 Friedman M A Program For MonetaryStability 1959 at 89 states that “The stock of money therefore 
seems to me the relevant magnitude in terms of which to formulate monetary rules and behavior …” 
The quantity rules of money gained a great deal of influence in guiding monetary policy for several 
decades following Friedman’s writings. 
67
 Stiglitz JE &Greenwald B Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics 2003 at 154. 
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accession of Fidel Castro in Cuba in the late 1950s saw a nationalisation of foreign owned 
monetary assets, a move that brought a serious diplomatic rift between Cuba and other 
states.68 In terms of the law enacted at the time, refered to as Law 891,69 national banks in 
Cuba were nationalised, thereby affecting countless foreign nationals in a case which 
amounted to property expropriation. A diplomatic fall-out occurred between the USA and 
Cuba. Under the guidance of Enersto Guevara, Cuba drifted away from the geo-political 
relations with the Americas and instead forged closer ties with the USSR and the rest of the 
Communist bloc. The USA retaliated by imposing a trade embargo70 and promulgating laws 
which resulted in the freezing of Cuban assets falling within the jurisdictional control the USA 
at the time.71 The developments cited above in relation to Cuba’s decisions reveal the extent 
to which ideological and political factors can wield such a gross influence on a state and 
even determine the legislative course it takes. 
Another determinant of a state’s policy choice concerns theories of justice. As explained 
below, the “Washington Consensus” influenced thinking as from 1989 and caused some 
sweeping changes on the Latin American and African national economies. The IMF and the 
World Bank were able, through the principle of conditionality, to prescribe monetary and 
other various economic measures to  the least developed countries (LDCs) in a typical 
bullying fashion. Principles such as privatisation, trade liberalisation and capital liberalisation, 
attributable to what Williamson proposed in his ground breaking paper that gave birth to what 
came to be known as the “Washington Consensus,”72 became the guiding principles in policy 
formulation. 
Much debate has taken place regarding the influence that the Washington Consensus had 
on the monetary policies of the LDCs. Whether or not it brought about any developments to 
those places is a question yet to be answered. Sornarajah opines that the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ was a neo-liberal initiative that was detrimental to the economic interests and the 
welfare of the less powerfull states.73 Williamson74 denies the imputation that it is an 
                                            
68
 Nielson v Secretary of Treasury 1970 54 International Law Reports 534. 
69
 Travieso-Diaz MF “Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropriated US Property in Post-
Castro Cuba” (2002) Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy 101-115 at 104. 
70
 Id. at 102. 
71
 The Cuban asset control regulations adopted by the USA were a response to the nationalisation of 
US assets in Cuba. Such a move resulted in legal battles brought before the municipal courts in the 
USA as some private individuals who had claims against the frozen properties took action to recover 
the said properties. The Nielsen v Secretary of the Treasury 1970 54 International Law Reports 534 is 
an  example of the case in which the freezing of Cuban properties through a retaliatory US legislation 
became subject of a major legal challenge. 
72
 Williamson J “The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development” (2004) Institute 
for International Economics  at 1-2. 
73
 Sornarajah M “Mutations of Neo-Liberalism in International Investment Law” (2011) Trade Law and 
Development at 212. At footnote 22, Sornarajah talks of the “Washington Consensus” as an alleged 
conspiracy between the White House, the IMF and the World Bank and attributes its growth in 
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advancement of a neo-liberal agenda. Whatever the justification of the ‘Consensus’ is, the 
policies of numerous states were certainly shaped by its ideological foundations as they were 
exported to the LCDs through the application IMF conditionality principle. This refers to 
conditions which states have to meet in order to qualify for IMF financial assistance and their 
discussion is out side the scope of this study. 
 Even if they sometimes sound highly cogent, political ideologies do not always sustain a 
viable economic system whereas rational decision does. Even though monetary phenomena 
such as inflation, deflation, and depression are ideologically neutral, they may be 
manipulated by a state in such a way as to produce a certain policy outcome  
Another factor that has a telling impact on global monetary relations is religion, an example 
of which is the Islamic religion giving birth to an Isamic monetary system. It is a unique model 
which draws its rationale from the deeply entrenched religious foundations of its proponents. 
To the extent that this system holds sway in so many countries which constitute a substantial 
portion of the global system, it can be conclusively stated that, as a result, the formation of a 
fully intergrated global monetary system shall for the forseeable future remain a pipe dream. 
It is in light of states’ regulatory burdens that the study turns to review the developments 
which have occurred in international monetary relations. The next section is devoted to the 
changes to regulatory approaches. 
 
2.4. RE-THINKING THE STATE’S POSITION  BEYOND WESTPHALIA 
Until the outbreak of the First World War, monetary regulation was the preserve of the 
individual states. The whole international monetary system was anchored on national rules75 
rather than on any international treaty. The system lacked any centralised coordination. That 
was the era of the gold standard, a very stable system in which states adopted the gold 
standard in alignment to the hegemonic influence of the British monetary system. The 
system was spontaneous rather than coordinated. The outbreak of the First World War 
marked an end of the gold standard as states  printed paper money to finance the budgetary 
deficits resulting from the increased demands of war. The end of the war in 1918 saw some 
                                                                                                                                        
popularity to the election of neo-liberals like Thatcher, Reagan and Kohl as leaders of the developed 
world. 
74
 Williamson J “The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development” in a Lecture 
delivered at the World Bank as part of a series (2004)  ‘"Practitioners of Development". Available at 
www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf (Accessed 04 January 2015). 
75
 Simmons BA “The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs” (2000) 54 (3) International 
Organisation 573-602 at  575. 
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attempts to return to the pre-war monetary system without success. The foundations of the 
pre-war gold anchor had already been grossly shaken.76 
National economies were hit by hitherto unprecedented hyper-inflation. The level of inflation 
experienced by Germany revealed the weaknesses of the recently adopted fiat standards. 
The Genoa conference convened in 1922 was meant, among other things, to curb the 
challenges of the new system but it did not bear fruit. States continued to act unilaterally with 
regards to monetary issues. The inter-war years were characterised by highly volatile 
economic conditions.  The Great depression of the 1920s to 1930s brought great pressure to 
bear upon national economies. The outbreak of the Second World War is to a great extent 
attributable to the economic challenges of the time. The Bretton Woods system emerged 
after World War II as the first attempt to build a truly international monetary system and 
marked the emergence of the “public international law of money.”77 The Bretton Woods 
system was based on a par value system whereby the US dollar was convertible to gold at a 
rate of $35/oz (thirty five dollars per ounce). 
That system remained very stable until 1971 when the USA “declared the end of the 
convertibility.”78  Since then, floating exchange rates replaced the par value system. The IMF 
made ammendments to its Articles on the realisation of the need to adapt the law to the 
demands of the time. The adoption of flexible and floating exchange rate arrangements 
resulted in a potentially chaotic situation. As each state received the freedom to pick and 
choose its own policy from a catalogue of alternatives, an opportunity was created for 
currency manipulations leading to misalignments and distorted patterns.79 States also carried  
out market intervention activities to either undervalue their own currencies or adopted 
measures to feign balance of payment equilibrium. The European monetary system 
developed in a way that brought harmonised exhange rate patterns among its member states 
in a typical ‘snake in the channel’80 fashion while laying the foundation for the EMU. 
Even in the days following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, states did not readily 
yield to the temptation to act in isolation. It was in those years immediately after the collapse 
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of the Bretton Woods system that Britain, in 1979,81 repealed the law on exchange controls, 
signifying a significant opening up of the markets to foreign participants. Since then, national 
economies have continued to drift closer towards one another in a manner that has brought 
greater levels of intergration. 
The prevalence of national monetary policies that produce adverse externalities on other 
economies has necessitated concerted action among states.82 The state is no longer an 
isolated and ultimate authority whose decisions are beyond scrutiny. Current international 
architecture positions most states such that they have to give account both within and 
without their borders.83 In the post-westphalian global order, “… the state will have an 
intermediary role between international and domestic concerns …”84 Apparently the 
emerging architecture is is a fundmanental shift from the erstwhile configurations of the 
international legal framework. The intermediary function is exercised between the state’s 
citizenship on the one hand and other functionaries in the international community on the 
other.85  As Viterbo notes86, the intermediary state will operate with a double-pronged focus. 
Its conduct in the formulation of internationally negotiated policies while pushing for the 
incorporation of domestic preferences within the international legal framework forms one of 
the two legs. The other is that the state also bears the responsibility to implement the 
internationally negotiated policies in the domestic legal order thereby making it imperative to 
view the conduct of the state as that of a bridge over various interest formations.87   
However, even after the obvious shift from the formations based on ‘jurisdictional exclusivity’, 
the distinction between domestic and international affairs still remains relevant.88 The 
question whether the state will cease to have relevance in the new configurations of power is 
answered in the negative. The states will remain key players in the multi-level structure. 
Concurring with Marks, Hooghe and Blank, Aalberts uses the following words to explain how 
the multi-level approach reconciles the demands of the state with those of the international 
community: 
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“As such multilevel governance seems to challenge both the external anarchy 
and the internal hierarchy element of the Westphalian principle. At the same time 
multilevel governance theorists in fact do not dispose of states – quite the 
opposite, as they argue that states will not only remain players, but even key 
actors in European politics.”89 
The ‘jurisdictional exclusivity’ of the state as regards internal domestic matters has fallen into 
the abyss of the yesteryears. The state’s “exclusive political authority within its geographic 
boundaries based on territorial and policymaking sovereignty,”90 has been greatly eroded. 
Kaul plausibly develops the concept of the intermediary state in the context of public finance 
in such an enlightening manner that the application of the same model to the state conduct in 
monetary affairs should not seem like a far-fetched adventure. The current state cannot 
ignore the “ever denser network of external expectations,”91 but has to blend those policy 
choices that have origins in the domestic arena with those of international origin so as to 
bring about mutual and aggregate benefits. 
Yet, in spite of all these seeming encroachments, the state’s regulatory machinery still 
remains the mainstay of monetary law. Jackson approporiately advances the view that it is 
not time to “dismiss the nation-state yet” adding that it “can be an important check on the 
misuse of power at an international or muliti-lateral level.”92 The only important point to watch 
is how state and international institutions interact to bring about the desired outcomes. The 
notion of ‘shared sovereignty’ has taken centre stage. From an analytical perspective 
therefore, it appears that the multi-level governance can help to mitigate the adverse effects 
of restrictive exchange controls, exchange rate misalignments, restrictions of inflows and 
outflows of capital between states. This would be achieved by placing great emphasis on 
collective engagement and maximising synergies between state actors. 
As the interdependence between national economies has become comprehensive, it is 
apparent that the unilateral regulation of the monetary system is no longer feasible. 
Connally’s comment regarding the global importance of the US dollar in 1971 when he said, 
“It may be our currency, but it’s your problem…,”93 shows how the mutual dependence of 
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monetary systems had already become a living reality then. More than ever before, this 
interdependence  has become a deeply ingrained phenomenon. The Sino-US “currency 
debate”94 is a sign that Chinese policy will no longer be the exclusive concern of Beijing. 
Instead, a change of policy in that country is likely to trigger some corresponding action in 
Washington or elsewhere in the world. The occassional reversion, by states, to national 
regulatory machinery in times of crisis, in a typical protectionist style threatens co-operation 
and subsequently brings the whole monetary system into jeorpady. Currency manipulations, 
exchange rate misalignments, and restrictions on capital inflows and outfows require 
collective action at all times. Developing a bridge between international and domestic 
spheres will go a long way in establishing the necessary conditions for stability.  
 
2.5. CHOICES AND PERSPECTIVES IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE  REGULATORY 
SYSTEM 
The current global monetary system is characterised by disjointed regulatory regimes, 
ranging from state regulators to regional as well as global multilateral institutions. This raises 
problems of norm conflict. The methods by which states integrate themselves into the 
international monetary system are numerous and therefore carrying out the task may be 
problematic. One choice is for the state to align itself with a hegemonic currency such as the 
British Pound Sterling, the Euro or the US dollar which would serve as a reserve currency for 
the state concerned. Another choice is “dollarisation,” whereby a state adopts the currency of 
another and uses it as its own. There is also the option of a “multilateral intergration” 
arrangement such as membership to a monetary union as well as a “go it alone approach.” 95 
The adoption of each choice tends to be a function of both domestic and international 
considerations.  
In the case of ‘dollarisation’, the state forfeits its monetary power and subordinates its 
monetary policy to that of the state whose currency it adopts. Examples of dollarisation 
include Zimbabwe96 and El Savador. A monetary union, an example of which is the EMU, is 
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an institution in terms of which several states integrate their monetary systems into one 
system. Monetary sovereignty is pulled together and the monetary union exercises it on 
behalf of member states. There is yet another possible arrangement called a currency board 
in terms of which the state anchores its currency to a relatively more stable currency. The 
challenge for the subordinate currency is that it becomes susceptible to the macro-economic 
pressures experienced by the  major currency.  
From 1989 to 2002, Argentina operated a currency board in terms of which the Peso was 
anchored on fixed parity to the US Dollar. When the Argentine national economy got severely 
strained at the beginning of the current millenium, the state abondoned the anchor and 
undertook a ‘pesification’ of all monetary obligations. The state’s unfavourable balance of 
payment position was responsible for the abondonment of the currency board arrangement 
by 2002.97 
Given the states’ freedom to design their monetary systems, the global system evidently 
operates without uniformity. Arguably there are some “long-standing structural weaknesses 
of our international monetary arrangements”98 that need to be addressed to bring stability to 
the system. Some of the most difficult choices concern the question of how to allocate 
authority between national and global functionaries. Largely, states adopt choices that are 
aimed at bringing about maximum benefits for their constituencies while international law 
institutions pursue interests that seek to benefit the larger global community. 
Faced with such difficult challenges in balancing divergent policy preferences, international 
co-operation presents itself as the most reasonable choice. The Rapport Camdesus succintly 
captures the pursuits of the international monetary law in saying: 
“The international monetary system to which we aspire is one that … maintains 
freedom of trade and current payments and that allows sharing more widely the 
benefits of financial globalization, appropriately regulated. It is a system where all 
countries recognize their stake in global stability and accept that near-term 
national objectives may, if needed, be constrained by the global interest.”99 
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The choice, therefore, is between assigning decision-making functions to national institutions 
and assigning the competences to the international level to be carried out by international 
institutions. It is a difficult one to make because of political and other interests that states 
must compromise in the process. It juxtaposes centripetal and centrifugal forces in a heavily 
contested tug of war.100 The centripetal or ‘centralisation’ theories are based on the belief 
that the state needs to sacrifice its own policy preferences in favour of the international 
preferences. This view erronoeusly assumes that there are some ‘neutral international 
preferences’ out there which exist independently of any national influences. Such a view 
disregards the fact that all choices carry some subjective tastes and self-interests of their 
proponents. 
Theories regarding the relationship between municipal and international law determine how 
the municipal and the international legal regimes interact to regulate the legal relationships. 
They determine how international legal norms are assimilated into municipal law. The 
dominant theories are monism and dualism. Monism means  that municipal and international 
law belong to the same legal system and “... municipal courts are obliged to apply rules 
without any need for an act of adoption by the courts or transformation by the legislature”101 
Their sources are the same. Once a norm attains the status of law in terms of international 
law,  it becomes unnecessary to take any other  municipal steps to give the norm the status 
of law in the municipal legal system. The doctrine of dualism on the other hand holds that “… 
international law and domestic law are two legal systems independent of each other.”102 This 
therefore necessitates a procedure by the state to assimilate international treaties into the 
domestic system. Without such processes, the treaty cannot enjoy the force of law in the 
domestic sphere.103  This artificial divide between ‘municipal’ and the ‘international’ law poses 
serious challenges on the implementation of international law in the municipal legal 
landscape. It also justifies a denial of rights and legal standing to private indivduals and non-
state actors. Cottier argues that, “while international law affects people, they often cannot 
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invoke it or rely upon it.”104 This is a strange scenario and it is out of step with the pervasive 
discourse of human rights. 
Due to the perception of municipal and international law as different legal systems, a risk of 
improperly regulated commons becomes a menacing reality. The argument that national and 
international law are founded on completely different principles is often employed to bolster 
the notion that ‘internationalisation’ of decision-making is not consistent with international 
legality. It is viewed with disdain, much as it is argued that there are countless and ‘deep-
rooted’ cultural, religious, linguistic and other differences between the peoples.105 It is ironic, 
however, that diversity is not a feature that is is exclusive to international communities but  it 
is also a feature of domestic communities. As regards this ‘diversity’ argument, Cottier’s well 
considered observation is that, “disagreement is not unique to international relations and 
law…”106 
As already stated, the view regarding the internationalisation of decision making holds that 
the state must take a back seat while an international institution such as the IMF or another 
with overall and sweeping jurisdiction must exercise law making functions. These laws would 
then bind all the states the way municipal law binds all citizens. In the absence of an 
international legislature endowed with compulsory law making functions, it is hard to imagine 
how the ‘centralisation’ would operate. Whether decision-making would take place at the 
level of an institution that has a universal outreach such as the UN, the IMF or at regional 
level such as the EU,  the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the SADC, 
there stands a very crippling criticism against this proposition. International institutions suffer 
from a ‘congenital defect’ of a ‘democratic deficit’ because their decisions emanate from state 
representatives who are not elected representatives of the people.107 The legitimacy of their 
decisions is questionable in the absence of a people-driven mandate. This amounts to a 
drifting away from democracry to ‘technocracy’ whereby the technically minded elite become 
the decision makers. It sounds like a lousy suggestion that unelected elites such as 
economists, lawyers, banking specialists and scholars, among others, should usurp the 
priviledges of the people. 
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Making choices in this area is a formidable task and Russel captures the complexity so 
accurately in saying, “But to understand the international side of monetary relations, one 
must look to domestic political structures, histories and politics.”108 
 
2.6. PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES IN DECISION MAKING 
Sound principles such as democracy and subsidiarity are the cornerstones of reasonable 
decision-making. With regards to the subsidiarity principle, it has been said, “The principle of 
subsidiarity stands out for the proposition that normative, political and legal decisions should 
be taken by the competent authority that is closest to where the impact of the decision will be 
felt.”109 When one considers that decisions touching on monetary regulation are in their 
nature technical, it is however debatable that the popular views of common masses who lack 
technical understanding of monetary dynamics should at all be esteemed when it comes to 
taking decisions on these matters. Without seeking to disregard and undermine the 
democratic rights of the citizens of nations, it is important to be mindful of the fact that the 
foundational principles relevant to the regulation of one branch of law differ in a 
fundmamental way from those applicable in another. Democratic representation, equality and 
justice are certainly the most applicable principles as regards the protection of human rights 
and access to clean water. In cases where monetary regulation is the subject of 
consideration, the principles of stability and peaceful relations between the concerned parties 
tend to be foundational.110 Considerations of alternative principles other than democracy 
seem logical. 
As a way of limiting the areas of contention in decision-making, an emphasis on processes 
rather than outcomes seems to be the sensible option. Among those legal scholars who 
uphold the importance of structures and procedures is Cottier who argues in favour of 
‘shared processes and structures of decision-making’.111 This creates an even-handed 
ground for consensus building among the numerous interest groups. These shared values, 
principles, structures and procedures in decision-making help to moderate some of the 
contestations that arise in relation to content based decision-making  approaches which 
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emphasise the contestable  theoretical issues.112 Another proponent of ‘process based’ 
rather than ‘outcome based’ decision-making governance is Franck who proposes the 
adoption of neutral principles to serve as the guide posts to the processes adopted.113 The 
application of these principles is meant to serve as the starting point for any assessment of 
the legitimacy of the decision taken. 
In reconciling the clash between domestic and international law,114 appropriate choices  must 
show regard to these principles and processes. Issues regarding how international objectives 
get to be incorporated into national law should consider the nature of the issue at hand, the 
persons who will be affected by the decisions, as well as the legitimacy of the decision in 
light of the competence of the concerned institution. To cure the defects of an  institution’s 
decision, a turn to the ‘subsidiarity’ principle may, notwithstanding its own ‘inherent 
weaknesses’,115 turn out to be the best option.  
The principle of subsidiarity116 is a very useful approach in light of the formulation of 
appropriate decisions. In other words, if there are numerous centres of decision-making all of 
which may be positioned to carry out a decision regarding a particular matter, the one closest 
to those affected by the decision may be the best one to make the decision. As already 
argued above, however, monetary decisions are of such a technical nature that a balancing 
of the principles of democracy and subsidiarity seems the most appropriate way to handle 
them. 
 
2.7. PARADIGMS AND STRUCTURAL DESIGNS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The question regarding the allocation of authority is very pivotal to the design of an efficient 
international monetary law framework. Due to globalisation there have been intrusive 
regulatory demands upon the competences of the state. The absence of a unified global 
governance structure leads to a lack of co-ordination of the major economic and financial 
matters in areas such as exchange rate determination. As already discussed above, states 
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sometimes engage in manipulative exchange arrangements in order to attain balance of 
payment equilibrium. This may lead to distorted exchange rates as well as currency 
misalignments. The potential synergies of national complimentarity somehow get lost in the 
fray of protectionism and self-seeking policy agendas. 
A theory of ‘multi-layered governance’ has developed in response to the competition between 
global and municipal institutions.117   Domestic or national law making bodies no longer enjoy 
exclusive priviledges in law making but are rather augmented in their function by the 
contributions of other national as well as international institutions. The multiple institutions, 
state agencies and international regulatory regimes interact in a complimentary fashion. In 
terms of the multi-level governance model, decision-making competencies are shared by 
actors at different levels and institutions. One of the contempory scholars of the structural 
evolution of the international law framework acknowledges the “… emerging system of 
multilayered governance by which different regulatory levels interact in a mutually supportive, 
or sometimes conflicting, manner.”118 He further explains hows these multiple layers of 
governance have developed across the wide spectrum of  “local, sub-national, regional and 
global levels.”119 
A thorough consideration of the emerging institutional relationships reveals the credibility of 
what Petersmann has observed as regards the changes that have become the defining 
pursuits of the contemporary legal age. The ‘vertical’ as well as ‘horizontal 
interdependencies’120 among state and non-state entities require an inclusive approach 
rather than fragmented and piece-meal solutions. While states could have in the past 
enjoyed exclusive legislative powers within their jurisdictions, the fact that global monetary 
stability now requires co-operation makes it imperative to work together. As such, numerous 
paradigms of  international law have emerged, which view the state not as the central 
regulator of monetary law, but more as one among multiple centres from which monetary law 
is being dispensed. 
These structural configurations can conveniently be described as either vertical or horizontal 
in nature. The relationship between the IMF and member states connotes a vertical 
interaction. This, however, is not a perfectly vertical configuration in that the IMF lakes 
absolute coercive command upon the state. Yet, to the extent that the IMF law binds the 
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member state, it is not a misplaced proposition that the state stands in a relatively 
subordinate level to the international institution. The Articles of the IMF do have a defining 
power on the monetary law of the state hence a vertical relationship is discernible between 
them. The same argument can also be advanced in defining the relationship between the 
WTO and the contracting powers. The emergence of the WTO law towards the end of the 
last millenium was seen as the emergence of the “WTO Constitutionalism.”121 The 
constitutionalisation of international law has been discussed in recent years by among others 
Petersmann122 amid an argument that the constitutional pattern is not yet fully developed. 
While the interaction between international organisations and their members may be seen to 
be fashioned in a vertical pattern, the same cannot be said regarding the various multilateral 
bodies. The WTO and the IMF legal regimes are independent of each other. They regulate 
international economic interaction in completely divergent spheres. Each one makes its own 
decisions based on its own rules, processes and pursuits. The fact that the state finds itself 
having to fulfill obligations in terms of a mandate assigned to it by its own ‘democratic 
constituents’ as well as the varied international bodies to which it owes allegiance by virtue of 
membership puts it in a rather precarious position. No wonder the averment of Pulkowski that 
contemporary international law ‘resembles a dense web of detailed prescriptions in almost 
any conceivable subject’123 has merit. 
International monetary law is certainly no exception as it is characterised by a plurality of 
institutions and centres of control. A horizontal relationship is clearly discernible when one 
takes a look at their patterns of interaction. The states act in the capacities of co-equal 
sovereigns, in a fashion that is typical of Westphalian patterns of international law. Under 
such a configuration, the state retains the traditional elements of monetary sovereignty. The 
state is the centre of monetary power and regulates its monetary affairs with little inhibition. 
However, the demands of ‘collective action’, particularly because of globalisation and the 
interdependent nature of monetary regulation force the state to act differently. Since 
monetary problems can no longer be contained within national frontiers,124 
internationalisation of decision-making has become the innevitable panacea to the global 
challenges. 
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Pulkowski’s three areas of concern125 then spring to the foreground and the answers to his 
questions do serve as a starting point in the search for the most workable and effective way 
of allocating authority in international law. The first question regards whether international 
law is still based on state sovereignty. The second one regards how best to account for the 
involvement of non-state actors in decision-making processes and the last one is an 
interrogation of the relationships between the various ‘functional subsystems’ such as 
regional groupings, monetary unions, free-trade areas as well as multilateral subsystems that 
enjoy a universal outreach such as the UN and its agencies such as the IMF, the OECD, and 
many others. There are also some legal obligations created in terms of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) which may also be applicable to  a particular monetary law dispute 
The answer to the first question is certainly negative as state sovereignty has evidently 
suffered much erosion.126 The intermediary state certainly no longer enjoys that unfettered 
power to regulate without external influence. Even the coercive power has been extended to 
other centres. Arbitration tribunals such as the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) do make binding decisions as do other tribunals that are set up 
in terms of international law. The decisions of the WTO’s Dipute Settlement Body (DSB) are 
also very significant in the area of bringing about a solution to the disputes.  Yet of course 
some of the major attributes of the state-centred international law such as the denial of legal 
personality and legal standing to private individuals and Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) remain very dominant. 
The second and the third questions cannot be answered simplistically without infering the 
emergence of a multilayered pattern of governance and it is in light of them that this study 
turns to explore the ‘structural paradigm’127 of multilevel governance. The plurality of legal 
regimes, centres of monetary power and decision-making have generated the discourse of 
‘fragmentation’ of international law.128 The state is a unique legal subsystem and so are the 
regional development groups, multilateral subsystems such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the IMF. The proliferation of 
numerous legal regimes and subsystems enjoying overlapping functions subsequently 
engenders norm conflict, thereby creating a problem of interpretation. Once the state has 
become party to these subsystems through signing and ratifying their founding statutes, 
multiple centres of control emerge with regards to the affairs of that state. 
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The intermediary state is, in terms of the emerging paradigms of international law,  expected 
to play the bridging function among the differently placed institutions. It provides that 
necessary bridge between the domestic and internation legal regimes. At the municipal level, 
it balances the demands of the citizens with the demands of the international community.  
Taking into account that the welfare of the citizens in the remotest part of the least developed 
countries (LDCs) cannot be compared with those of  the inhabitants of London, Berlin and 
New York, it follows that the state’s legislative power must be carefully exercised  to protect 
the weaker while at the same time protecting the welfare of the rich. Starting from the 
premise that global monetary stability is good for the rich and the poor alike, the state 
therefore walks the tight rope of keeping stability while also observing the preferences of the 
various interest groups. As an intermediary functionary and also by virtue of being in 
possession of the power of coercion, the state remains the focal point of international 
monetary regulation and its power to legislate is protected in terms of the principles of 
democracy and subsidiarity. In terms of democracy, the state is assumed to be a legitimate 
bearer of the mandate granted by its people.  
It is one among several levels of governance. The decisions made by it have application not 
necessarily as absolute and unquestionable decrees but are rather evaluated within the 
context of the broader international framework. Since national constitutions have become 
“partial constitutions,”129 recourse must always be had to the law of international systems 
particularly where the law of the state does not adequately address the matters concerned.  
It is noteworthy that the ‘muliti-level European governance’ pattern cannot be simply 
extended to the global system without the risk of distortion,130 whether as an interpretive 
model or as a new way of configuring relations. The diversified character of the nations of the 
world requires a measure of harmonisation in order to fully function as a fully intergrated 
system. Notwithstanding the diversity however, it is not altogether irrational to perceive the 
relations between nations as already exhibiting a tendency towards unified behaviour.  
Questions regarding allocations of competences among the various layers of a multi-level 
system echo with infinite resonance and as already noted in terms of the European example 
of multi-level governance, it always matters who does what.131  
While the EU system has been evolving since its inception and has formed clearly 
demarcated formulas for ‘competence allocation’, the interaction that takes place at 
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international level is still a hybrid of ‘state-centred’ and ‘multilayered’ formations. It is 
altogether appropriate at this juncture to say that the ‘multilayered governance’ structural 
pattern is already in operation and the EU has taken it to an advanced stage. 
One way of viewing the current global monetary system therefore is to see the IMF law as 
constituting a layer in which all members are represented, the OECD law as another as do 
the numerous regional monetary unions, the state, the agencies and organs of the state as 
well NGOs. It can aptly be perceived as a heterarchical structure consisting of the functional 
areas with complimentary roles towards each other. This mosaic of functional sites creates 
the uniquely complex network of legal relations. Even the state level exhibits these numerous 
functional sites. As Pulowski notes, “… state law has become a site for internal legal 
pluralism”132 as various domestic sub-groups make decisions, thereby turning themselves 
into legal subsystems. The same legal pluralism is discernible in the context of the 
international legal system. 
From the analysis of trends in recent years, state law is giving way to other regimes. Its 
functional frontiers are receeding. A new trend is drifting in while new power allocations are 
being forged.133 New players134 such as non-governmental organisations have sprung into 
relevance while the clamour for human rights also means that the individual citizen has 
gained great international recognition.135 Various national and international legal regimes that 
regulate monetary matters are on the increase.136 The problems that are most prominent 
have to do with the task of co-ordinating these functional areas and this comes largely 
because no single institution enjoys over-arching powers of command or compulsory 
jurisdiction.137 The IMF which could have played that co-ordinating role has certainly not 
done so.138 
What complicates the current relationships is the absence of a ‘general international law’139 
which encompasses all areas of law. As a result, the law is compartmentalised into various 
functional areas and fragments. Decisions are taken within each compartment in a manner 
that sometimes has no regard for the other functional areas. Monetary matters are dealt with 
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in a different way from trade, human rights or investment matters. The focus of monetary 
regulation has also shifted from ‘territoriality to functionality’140 in response to the emergence 
of private and public institutions. 
With the emergence of multiple centres of monetary power, and as national public goods turn 
into global public goods, the international legal system needs to develop suitable 
‘competence allocation’ patterns. The conclusive remarks of Petersmann succintly capture 
the importance of multilevel constitutionalism. He says: 
 “Arguably, multilevel cosmopolitan constitutionalism offers more appropriate 
constitutional, legal, and democratic foundations for the collective supply of 
citizen-driven ‘aggregate public goods’ based on economic liberalism and 
cosmopolitan rights than state-centered ‘legal nationalism’ cultivating welfare-
reducing border discrimination.”141 
Indeed, interdependent sectors, institutions and structures have become pervasive 
patterns. The multilevel structural paradigm would, more than any other, provide the 
appropriate environment for the delivery of a stable global monetary system. 
2.8. CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter revealed that money is a ‘global public good’ falling into the class of 
‘interdependent global public goods.’ Its regulation in the current international legal 
framework can best be carried out by a fully co-operative international legal system rather 
than by individualistic and self-seeking state laws. Domestic regulators are no longer 
sufficiently enabled to carry out such functions hence the need for multi-functional, multi-
sectoral, multi-regional, and internationally coordinated regulatory mechanisms. The state 
can no longer single handedly deal with this all important task for which high level co-
ordination has been shown to be important. As Petersmann argues, the “collective supply of 
international public goods requires rules, institutions, and governance mechanisms going 
beyond those of the Westphalian system of ‘international law among sovereign states’”142 
The Westphalian system of international law, with its main attributes and ramifications is no 
longer sufficiently equipped to deal with the tasks before it. The intergrated international legal 
community can no longer be sufficiently serviced by out-dated patterns and models. The 
multilevel governance approach has become the most appropriate structural paradigm of 
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international monetary regulation. Although the various layers and functional centres are 
more well developed in the European Community than elsewhere in the world, the principles 
already tried and tested in the Community can be extended to other centres and regions 
albeit with necessary modifications. 
In the next chapter, the study discusses the theoretical matters regarding monetary 
sovereignty while also exploring the elements of monetary sovereignty through an analysis of 
specific legal regimes ranging from national, regional to global multilateral legal systems.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of monetary sovereignty, particularly in the present age, remains highly relevant 
in shaping the global monetary system inspite of the changes and developments that have 
occurred in international economic relations. The previous chapter considered the conduct of 
the modern state with regards to monetary affairs. It emerged that expectations have 
changed significantly over the years and that new paradigms have emerged in an attempt to 
adequately address the emerging needs of the global monetary system.  
A proper understanding of the theoretical matters regarding sovereignty helps to shed light 
on the factors that shape decision making in international monetary relations. The powers of 
the state and its interaction with other institutions through bilateral and multilateral 
engagements are decisive determinants of the choices made by states. Since the state is an 
intergral part of the  multilateral system, the way it is perceived continues to be highly 
influential. 
This chapter begins by giving a brief explanation of the reasons why states cling so tightly 
onto sovereignty even in the face of highly compelling changes. Secondly, it unpacks the 
incidences of monetary sovereignty and its practical effects, thus exploring how the 
particular incidences such as exchange rate determination, exchange controls and capital 
controls shape the contemporary monetary system. Building upon the premise that 
sovereignity is not a static concept to be expressed only in terms of positive law,143 the third 
section of the chapter undertakes an exploration of its normative attributes144 as well as their 
role in shaping international monetary order. The fourth and the last section looks at how 
role players have responded to the normative demands of the age through the pulling 
together of sovereignty within various international institutions.  
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3.2. MONETARY POWER, FISCAL MATTERS AND THE STATE 
Throughout history, states have resorted to inflationary printing of money when ever they 
found themselves in urgent need of cheap money.145 Inflationary printing of money is a 
cheap source of cash for a state during times of war or other emergencies. The state relies 
on  ‘inflation tax’146 because of 
“ … the existence of a close interaction between the monetary regime, (that is, 
the behavior of the central bank / monetary authorities) and the fiscal regime (that 
is, the tax and spending behavior of governments) …”147 
The connection is the reason why states are not prepared to easily relinquish their monetary 
sovereignty. Seigniorage tax148 is an important means to generate revenue for the state. 
Cohen defines it as 
“the spending power that accrues from the state’s ability to create money. 
Technically identified as the excess of the nominal value of a currency over its 
cost of production …”149 
 It can be perceived as the difference between the face value of a note or a coin and the 
actual cost of printing the note or minting it. Debasement, a practice whereby a cheap alloy 
of metal is minted into coin of less real value than the face value is sometimes adopted to 
raise state revenue. 
Mundell150 attributes the rise of state monopoly in monetary production to the emergence of 
‘overvalued moneys’. States exploit their capacity to charge seigniorage tax for fiscal 
purposes. They use it to generate revenue and to finance governmemental expenditure. It is, 
however, of critical importance to realise that some states have lately sacrificed their 
seigiorage rights through dollarisation, adoption of currency boards and other measures. 
These states have been able to restrict themselves to prudent conduct as they pursue a 
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greater ideal. The greater ideal is monetary stability seen as more important than inflation 
financing.  
The concept of monetary sovereigny still faces so much criticism from various quarters, 
among them the free banking school. It is argued that states should liberalise the issuing of 
bank notes and coins to allow private players just as there is free production of shoes in an 
open market.151 One of the proponents of the liberalisation of ‘monetary production’, 
Hulsmann seriously questions the economic assumptions which support the state’s 
monopoly of monetary production.152 The dominant view, however, is that the state’s 
sovereignty over monetary affairs is a long established fact which needs not be debated 
further.153 The normative elements of monetary regulation, which shall be discussed in one 
of the succeeding sections, include maintenance of monetary stability as an important quality 
of the monetary system, one which private parties cannot sufficiently protect. The position of 
states with regards to accountability, legitimacy and assurances of monetary stability poses 
less risk than private players would. 
The prevalence of three principal corrective devices used by states, namely exchange rate 
alteration, direct commercial and financial controls including quantity and exchange 
restrictions as well as instruments of adjustment in domestic economic policies154 are very 
important to the running of national economies. The privatisation of such instruments would 
deprive the state of the vital tools of governance. The state’s choice and use of the 
corrective measures is the collective concern of all others because of their impact on other 
states. The states’ use of corrective devices is the next point of the discussion. 
 
3.3. MULTIDIMENSIONAL MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: A SEARCH FOR IDEALS 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the concept of monetary sovereignty seemingly 
exhibits both positive and normative attributes.  A definition of the concept serves as a 
convenient starting point for the discusion. 
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A reference to the positive conceptions of monetary sovereignty suggests a catalogue or list 
of competencies enjoyed by states in this area of law. It tells of the rights, entitlements and 
powers that a state enjoys in the area of monetary regulation. It  is a reference to ‘the law as 
it is rather than the law as it ought to be.’ As regards legal positivism, Johnson et al  say: 
“Austin acknowledges that beyond the law as it is or positive law, there lies the 
important science of ethics and morality which is concerned with law as it ought 
to be and how to study legislation.”155  
This approach to law, concerning itself with the formal contours of the black letter is 
premised upon the assumption that the law can be verifiable just by looking at what is written 
in the municipal and multilateral statutes and codes. Since the law is nothing but ‘the 
commands of the sovereign’,156 it would be easy to find out what monetary law is just by 
looking into state enactments or international conventions. A simple study of relevant 
sources of law reveals the legal position on any matter. The criticism directed against 
Durgard157 sheds light on the nature of the contestations that exist with regard to legal 
positivism. However, these debates lie outside the scope of this work. 
A normative discourse of the law on the other hand leads to an enquiry into many facets of 
the law among them the theories of justice that underly every decree of law.158 The concept 
of ‘justice’ refers to “the need for justifying law and governance on the basis of principles of 
procedural, distributive, corrective or ‘commutative justice’ or principles of equity.”159 The law 
is perceived as a discipline that is laden with values of multiple dimensions. Since the law is 
meant to regulate the lives of people and not innanimate objects, it cannot be seen to be 
distant from the needs of those whose lives it seeks to regulate. Among numerous 
considerations, a balance has to be struck between diverse narratives of analysis. 
Reference to communitarianism, liberalism, realism among others provides yardsticks 
against which sovereign action can be measured.160 
Theories of justice within normative value systems therefore set a contextual background for 
the conceptualisation of monetary sovereignty. Petersmann suggests that there is need to 
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see the importance “of ‘public reason’ based on cosmopolitan freedoms and other ‘priciples 
of justice’.”161 The plurality of approaches162 and legal traditions create a playing field where 
theories of justice such as utilitarianism meet with legal positivism, thus influencing both the 
formulation and interpretation of the law. Continual review of the changing values and 
aspirations of the global society need not be altogether ignored and the the law should never 
stagnate in comformity with the value systems of Westphalia. Rather it must continue to 
inform the agenda for future legal developments. 
 
3.4. MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: A  LEGAL POSITIVISTIC VIEW 
When approached from the angle of legal positivism, a number of definitions have been 
proposed for the concept of ‘monetary sovereignty’.163 Mundell breaks it into constituent 
parts as 
 “the right to determine what constitutes the unit of account – the commodity or 
token in which the price lists are specified, the right to determine means of 
payment – legal tender for the purposes of discharge of debt and the right to 
produce money – or else to determine the conditions under which it is to be 
produced by others.”164 
Lastra on the other hand perceives the concept so broadly as to encompass the “power to 
issue notes and coins”, to regulate internal and external dimensions of money, the banking 
system and the determination of credit levels and rules, the management of the payment 
and settlement systems, the competence to make decisions regarding money supply and 
interest rates and determine monetary policy. It also includes the right to control the 
exchange rates and choice of exchange regime as well as the power to introduce and 
maintain exchange and capital controls.165 In recent years banking regulation and 
supervision have seemed to attract greater international attention due in part, to the spill-
over effects arising from systemic failure experienced in various states. 
Mann states that:  
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“[T]he municipal legislator is free to define the currency of his country, to decide 
whether or no it should be based on gold, to depreciate and appreciate its value, 
to permit or abolish gold clauses, to impose exchange control or to take other 
measures affecting monetary relations.”166 
Explicably, it is within state competences to act in self-interest and impose exchange 
restrictions, maintain restrictions on current account convertibility, capital controls and to 
inhibit cross-border capital flows as well as to avoid currency manipulations which may 
cause exchange rate instability.167 The attributes cited above are at the core of the concept 
and though not cast in stone, have arguably crystalised into a conclusive outline of the 
concept.  One of the most prevailing and long-standing assertions is that “Money is a 
creature of the Law.”168 The state is also responsible for determining the unit which serves 
as the basis of the monetary system.169  
A point by point analysis of the key attributes is the subject of the next subsection. 
 
3.4.1 THE STATE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING THE CURRENCY UNIT 
The determination of a currency unit can be approached on the basis of a technical or a 
nominalist theory.170 As Knapp171 explains, in terms of the technical approach, the value of 
one unit is expressed in relation to another. The application of the comparative approach is 
in line with the commodity approach to money. In line with the dominance of a fiat standard, 
this approach has fallen out of step with modern practice. By juristic acts, the state creates 
means of payment that do not have the character of commodities or specie. As such, bank 
notes express a monetary unit which has no connection with any specie or weights of 
precious commodities as used to be the case. 
While the pound used to represent a weight and the gold smith or reserve bank could, if 
called upon to pay a pound, simply weigh bullion and give it out in payment, things became 
complicated in recent years due to the emergence of inconvertible paper moneys. A British 
Pound Sterling cannot be perceived as a weight any more. It is a creature of a national legal 
tradition and obtains its name through a historical and recurrent linking with the erstwhile 
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specie that once constituted it. It can best be characterised as “simply a name for something 
which cannot be precisely defined.”172 The same can be said concerning the dollar. 
The value of a bank note or coin does not differ from the inscription upon its face and by the 
principle of nominalism a one Dollar obligation is fully discharged by a similarly denominated 
note or coin. The paper has no instrinsic value in itself. A dollar is what the legislature 
declares it to be, nothing more nothing less. A unit may be created by a treaty or 
supranational institution as in the case of the Euro. It is not an expression of weight. Its 
definition has to be sought outside the realm of weights. Whether it is to be called a pound, 
dollar, mark, yen or rand is a matter that can only be determined in terms of national law.173 
The South African statutory law ilustrates the point clearly: 
“The monetary unit of the Republic shall be the rand (abbreviated as R), and the 
cent (abbreviated as c), which is one hundredth part of the rand.”174 
The determination of the unit is a matter that lies exclusively in the province of the state. 
Another important point is the locus of the power to coin and to print notes and is next point 
to consider. 
 
3.4.2 COINAGE AND PRINTING OF BANK NOTES: UNASSAILABLE ATTRIBUTES OF 
STATEHOOD 
Coinage took place in Rome as far back as 300 BC, long before the city states of Greece175 
did it. The authority of the state in regulating coinage was acknowledged in the Hellenic city 
states, recognising176 the state’s exclusive authority in this regard. Meanwhile, the US 
Constitution empowers the Congress; 
“To coin money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the 
Standard of Weights and Measures; To provide for the Punishment of 
conterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;”177 
Coinage of money by non-sovereigns has always attracted severe penalties. The trial of 
Louis Secretain in the middle ages is a prime example of such trials which resulted in the 
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execution of the convicts.178 Jesus, more than two thousand years ago, also seemingly 
acknowledged Ceaser’s prerogative of money production.179 All these submissions point 
towards the fact that coinage has, since antiquity, been viewed as an intergral part of 
sovereignty. 
 
3.4.3 MONETARY STANDARD SETTING 
The state sets a monetary standard in terms of its sovereign powers through anchoring the 
monetary unit to one of the select standards such as commodities. It also has the power to 
demonetise commodities and to change parities without being liable in international law. 
Faced with an unstable currency in 1933, the US Congress passed a joint resolution to 
abrogate gold clauses. All payments in gold were subsequently rendered unlawful and 
obligations covered by such clauses were to be paid in terms of the nominal value ‘dollar for 
dollar’180. The resolution substantially altered the value that creditors would receive. In the 
case of Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.181 one of the several prejudiced parties 
questioned the constitutional validity of the resolution. The importance of the resultant US 
Supreme Court decision in the context of the current discussion is the extent to which it 
butresses the argument that determination of monetary standards is a state competence. 
The adoption of ‘debased’ or ‘token’ coins by the British government at the height of the 
Napoleonic wars was a sovereign act for which the state would not incur liablity in terms of 
domestic or international law. The resumption of convertibility182 was a purely sovereign act. 
The US Coinage Act of 1873 which resulted in the demonetisation of  silver and ended the 
days of the bimetalism of gold and silver was another sovereign act which demonstrably 
endorsed the practice of the state priviledge to determine the monetary standard.183 
The power of state power to set a monetary standard is therefore an established fact of law 
and each state determines whether its money is to be based on a commodity standard such 
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as gold184, silver or a fiat standard. Convertibility or non-convertibility of currency into specie 
also forms part of this competence. 
 
3.4.4 EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION 
The state also determines the exchange regime for its currency. When exchange rates are 
unilaterally determined by each state, there is room for their manipulation. One of the 
purposes of the IMF as spelt out in its Articles of Agreement is to “avoid manipulating 
exchange rates or the international monetary system …”185 The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1971 restored to states the powers to determine exchange regimes. The 
system had operated on a fixed par value system but its collapse allowed for several options 
of exchange rate regimes for states to choose from.186 These range from fixed exchange 
rate regimes, free floating exchange systems, pegged floats, floats crawling within narrow 
bands among others. Some currencies are either pegged to stable reserve currencies such 
as the US Dollar or the Pound Sterling while others are anchored to a basket of dominant 
international  currencies. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 restored the 
states’ power in the area of exchange rate determination. The IMF was “stripped of its 
pricing and regulatory role with respect to the developed world …”187 
The debate regarding the locus of sovereignty particularly with regards to monetary power 
seems to favour the view that the state still enjoys a great deal of power inspite of what 
appears to be a sweeping tide of globalisation. After protracted diplomatic engagements 
between China and the USA over the allegedly undervalued Chinese currency, a factor 
largely considered by the USA as generating negative effects on the US economy, the 
adoption of a policy of “quantitative easing”188 by the Obama administration in 2009 was 
undoubtedly an invocation of the state’s sovereign powers.  
Even though there appears to be freedom of choice and action, the IMF keeps a keen watch 
over the state’s conduct with regards to exchange rate regimes and implementation.189 The 
                                            
184
 Booysen H Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System  2003 at 320. 
185
 Article IV:1(iii) of the IMF  
186
 Jung H “Tackling Currency Manipulation with International Law: Why and How Currency 
Manipulation should be Adjudicated?” (2012) 9 (2) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law  
184-200, at 193. 
187
 Howse R “Sovereignty Lost and Found” in Shan W, Simmons P and Singh D (eds) Redefining 
Sovereignty in International Economic Law 2008 at at 67. 
188
 Rickards J supra at 134 states that “Quantitative easing in its simplest form is just printing money”. 
Rickards describes how the increase in the money supply of the Federal reserve system generated 
inflation abroad and produced a cheaper dollar thereby stimulating the US export market while 
depressing the import market.  As a result, 25 Million jobs were generated. 
189
 Mussa M “IMF Survellance Over China’s Exchange rate Policy (2007) Peterson Institute of 
International Economics at 1. 
44 
 
University of South Africa 2015 
 
prevalence of an allegation of exchange manipulation is indicative of the fact that neither 
China nor the USA enjoys unlimited right of action with regards to her exchange rate 
choices.190 Even though liberty is available to the states, discriminatory multiple exchange 
rate systems, currency manipulations and unorthodox market interventions are the causes 
for so-called ‘currency wars’.191 
 
3.4.5 DECLARATION OF LEGAL TENDER 
The law of the state determines legal tender.192 Numerous payment instruments may 
perform monetary functions without necessarily being legal tender. An example of such an 
instrument is foreign currency. In Zimbabwe, between the years 2002 and 2009, market 
players circulated the South African Rand, the Botswana Pula, the US  Dollar, and the British 
Pound Sterling even though the currencies were not legal tender. The official adoption of the 
foreign currencies as legal tender193 only legitimised what had long become market 
practice.194 
The effects of the declaration of legal tender by state authorities is far reaching. Once an 
instrument acquires legal tender status, its presentation leads to a discharge of the debt from 
the monetary obligation for which it is offered. The English case of mixed moneys195 involved 
a dispute regarding the Queen of England’s powers to declare legal tender when she expost 
facto changed legal tender to the detriment of a certain debtor. When the debtor refused the 
debased tender and sued for payment in terms of the previous monetary compositions, the 
debtor  succesfully raised a ‘legal tender’ plea. The case illustrates “the great importance of 
the institution of legal tender and the authority of the sovereign to determine legal tender.”196 
The US legal tender cases of the 19th century also clearly illustrate this point. The state 
enacted the Legal Tender Act in 1862, in terms of which ‘greenbacks’ were to be accepted 
as ‘legal tender for all debts.’ The notes carried a lower intrinsic value than coins of the same 
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denomination. The constitutionality of the Act was questioned in the courts in a number of 
cases such as the Hepburn v Griswold197 case. It was reiterated that the power to declare 
legal tender is inherent in the sovereignty of the state. The constitutional validity of the 
printing of ‘greebacks was challenged on the basis that to “coin money” is not synymous with 
printing it.198 As is apparent from the preceding discussion, the cases underscored the 
state’s power to declare the instruments that serve as legal tender. 
In terms of South African law, a statute defines legal tender.199 Different jurisdictions have 
the power to pass laws that determine legal tender.200 The power to enact legal tender laws 
clearly belongs to the state. 
 
3.4.6 CURRENCY VALUATION AS AN ESTABLISHED STATE COMPETENCE 
The state’s sovereign power to fix the internal as well as the external value of its currency is 
a settled matter in international law.201 Customary international law does not place liablity on 
a state for the fluctuation of the value of its currency triggered by bona fide monetary 
reform202 unless the state action systematically targets individuals of a particular nationality. 
The test for the legitimacy of state conduct is that it must be in pursuit of monetary stability, 
solvency and other related economic criterion. The state can devalue currency or revalue it 
while carrying out sovereign duties. In the Zuk Claim203 case which concerned depreciated 
Russian Roubles, the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission held that “It is 
universally recognized that all matters pertaining to currency are inherently within the 
jurisdiction of the state.” A simillar line of reasoning was followed in the case of Malan 
Claim204 regarding the depreciated Italian Lira. This power of the state can however be 
limited in certain circumstances to avoid unfavourable results and a state will invoke 
diplomatic protection of the rights of its citizens in cases of discrimination and abuse of 
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rights.205  Nationalisation, prohibition of transfer as well as compulsory expropiation of 
property belonging to aliens, are measures which diminish a person’s rights to enjoy his 
property and if done without adequate compensation, are actions not justifiable within the 
ambit of national sovereignty.206 
 
3.4.7 EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS, CURRNCY CONVERTIBILITY AND CAPITAL 
RESTRICTIONS 
Movements of capital in and out of an economy can cause disruptions of the monetary and 
financial systems and to avoid these effects, states sometimes adopt restrictions of inflows 
and outflows as macro-economic management services. Exchange restrictions207 are also 
an important tool to redress a balance of payments problem, to stabilise exchange rates and 
prevent capital flight.208 
States employ the corrective instruments in response to what Kelsey calls the 
“… six distinct fears: fear of currency appreciation that impacts on exports and 
the broader economy; the risks of sudden capital injections and reversals arising 
from so-called ‘hot money’ flows; dislocations that large capital inflows might 
cause to the financial system; the disconnect between monetary policy objectives 
and capital inflows; the fuelling of property and stock market bubbles; and capital 
flight in reaction to domestic or international crises.”209  
Owing to the importance of cross border capital movements, states do sometimes adopt 
policies that render their currencies either convertible or inconvertible. Convertibility refers to 
the freedom to exchange domestic currency for foreign currencies.210 Transactions can be 
classified as being either of a current or capital  nature. States are, in terms of customary 
international law, free to unilaterally impose restrictions on international payments without 
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incuring any international wrong by their actions.211 Restrictions on current payments are 
however problematic.  
Current transactions refer to “payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current 
business, including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities …”212 A 
transaction is current “if it gives rise to the immediate return of goods or services”213 and is 
distinguishable from a capital one which “gives rise to a future return.”214 Multilateral legal 
regimes such as the IMF Article VIII (2) and the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Visible and 
Invisible Current Transactions have brought substantial limitations on the state’s power to 
restrict current payments. It is unveiled in Chapter4 of this study that certain constraints 
operate against exchange restrictions. 
Capital transactions relate to movement of capital for the purposes of investment. They are 
principal transactions while current payments are surbodinate to some underlying 
transaction215 such as a sale of visible goods or payment for an invisible transaction such as 
a rendered service. Exchange controls create many problems as they can sometimes 
prohibit the importation or exportation of domestic bank notes.216 
Even with all the disadvantages they may pose, capital controls are an attribute of statehood 
often used to counter the destabilising effects of capital movements.217 The adoption of 
exchange controls by Iceland218 in 2008 is a recent example of an attempt by a state to 
protect its monetary system from the possible destabilising effects of cross border capital 
flows. Korea did the same in 2010 in order to avoid a looming crisis.219 
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3.4.8 THE OPERATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESRICTIONS OR DIRECT CONTROLS 
Quantitative restrictions are also employed to correct a balance of payments disequilibrium 
just as the monetary or trade measures may be used for the same purposes. Trade 
measures and monetary controls play complimentary corrective functions on the 
economy.220 The Tokyo Declaration of 1973 stated that:  
 “The policy of liberalizing world trade cannot be carried out successfully in the 
absence of parallel efforts to set up a monetary system which shields the world 
economy from the shocks and imbalances which have previously occurred.”221  
As Seigel notes, “the objectives of the WTO and the IMF are complementary.”222 GATT 
Article XV is the closest attempt to bridge the gap between the two international economic 
institutions since the coming into effect of the second amendement of IMF Article IV in 
1978.223  
 
3.4.9 THE BANKING SYSTEM AND DETERMINATION OF MONEY SUPPLY AND 
POLICY 
While the state still retains the competence to coin money and print bank notes, it remains 
important to realise that money supply is no longer the exclusive domain of the state. Money 
in the form of notes and coins constitutes a very small fraction of the total monetary supply in 
most national monetary economies.224 Rickards for instance notes that while the monetary 
base in the form of coins and bank notes constitutes about 20% of the total federal reserve 
system money supply, banks are responsible for creating the 80% through issuing credit and 
demand deposits.225  Private institutions such as banks create monetary aggregates such as 
demand deposits and credit which technically increases money supply in an economy. 
Expansionary or contractionary outcomes on the national money supply are effected through 
the banking system. Unless the state exercises control over the creation of credit and other 
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instruments of payment, it cannot claim to have full control over its monetary affairs. Central 
banks carry out supervisory functions on behalf of the state and also provide lender of last 
resort services so as to safeguard financial stability which has remote but realistically 
harmful effects on the monetary system.226 
Having analysed the position of the law regarding the power of the state to coin money, to 
determine monetary units and standards, to unilaterally alter the exchange rate, to devalue 
the currency, to adopt and maintain exchange controls and restrictions, it is a conceivable 
proposition that state monetary powers are still comprehensive and far reaching. The 
position well expressed by Shuster  who says that: 
“… a state is uninhibited in its power to alter the exchange rate of its currency 
and to impose exchange controls (subject to certain largely ineffective 
limitations), without thereby giving rise to an international wrong, even though 
foreign creditors and international trade will almost invariably be affected by such 
measures”227, 
is still highly persuasive. Shuster228 acknowledges the existence of limitations or 
constraints operating against state power albeit with modest effects. It is the constraints 
alluded to above which lie at the heart of the next chapter of this study. 
 
3.5. NORMATIVE TRAITS OF MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY 
Every exercise of power leans on certain normative values and the exercise of monetary 
sovereignty is no exception. As an instrument of governance, the law needs to be justified 
through reference to values.229 The values are numerous and varied and their delimitation 
remains a highly contested terrain.230 Among them however are; “democracy, equality, 
accountability, and legitimacy and more specific ones like economic development, the 
maximization of global welfare, the maintenance of financial intergrity, and the promotion of 
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financial and monetary stability.”231 Economic theory is a value system that influences the 
law making process in a significant way. A look at each of these values in the context of 
what effect it has on the exercise of monetary sovereignty will shed light on how the concept 
continues to evolve in an adaptative fashion in response to the on-going developments. 
In one of his recent publications, Petersmann poses at least fifteen questions under the 
rubric of “basic systemic questions and regulatory problems of international economic 
regulation in the twenty first century.”232 His second question reads as follows: 
“Does IEL need to be justified by theories of justice? Is the prevailing conception 
of ‘public international law among sovereign states’ consistent with the human 
rights obligations of all UN member states …”233 
He goes on to say that anyone trying to answer any of these questions will be 
influenced by the normative premises upon which he stands.234 How are human rights, 
democracy and cosmopolitan liberties to be reconciled with majoritarian dictatorship, 
utilitarianism and ‘state interests’ normally communicated through the dominant voice 
of those wielding power? If a legislative act of a state can impoverish a private 
individual and wipe out lifetime savings as happened to Zuk235, it may be asked 
whether international law should not come to the rescue of the individual through a 
creditor friendly remedy? Such questions strike at the foundation of the principles of 
justice. 
In light of these normative concerns, it goes without saying that the erstwhile perceptions of 
monetary sovereignty cannot meet the demands of the age. A positivist and formalistic 
outlook towards the concept disregards the values, largely viewing monetary sovereignty 
through the prism of a cataloged list of state competences. Such a view certainly overlooks 
the interdependencies that have become part and parcel of the current international 
economic relations.  
Positive rules of monetary sovereignty have increasingly fallen victim to the re-defining 
changes of the new age. The predominance of values such as democracy tends to promote 
a more people oriented perception of sovereignty than autocratic kings of antiquity were 
ready to admit. Instead of forcibly obtained allegiance that granted sovereign status to the 
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autocrats and hereditary monarchs, the state institutions have been re-modelled as servants 
of the people. Sovereignty has become representative in nature.236 The people form the 
principal body and the state acts in a representative capacity on behalf of the body. It is not 
the head of state who is the bearer of sovereignty but he exercises it on behalf of the 
electorate. The social contract theories become relevant in the analysis. 
Closely aligned to democratic values is the matter regarding legitimacy. Unless those 
endowed with power to govern are perceived as  legitimate, their acts remain subject to 
challenge. ‘Collusion’ among peridically elected politicians and rent-seeking interest groups 
tend to divert the national agenda but decentralisation of power into international institutions 
is an important safeguard for democratic ideals.237 Emphasis on the ideals of economic 
development, the quest for the maximisation of global welfare, the maintenance of financial 
intergrity, the promotion of financial and monetary stability all point towards the need for an 
interpretive approach that recognises the dynamism of monetary sovereignty. 
 
3.6. RESPONSES TO CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES  IN THE FACE OF EMERGING 
TRENDS 
Sovereignty as a concept is not static,238 but has been evolving in response to socio-political 
as well as economic changes. As a concept of power allocation,239 it has resulted in a 
fundamental shift of power from the realm of the state and a re-distribution of competences 
to regional and global institutions. The effect has been both a dimunition of sovereignty and 
a consolidation of it.240 States increasingly lean towards international institutions such as 
monetary unions as a way to contain the challenges of a globalised market. 
The EMU is a highly intergrated monetary system which has been formed in response to the 
creation of an open market within the European continent. The adoption of currency boards 
as well as dollarisations are some of the responses to the changing demands of the age. 
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The recession that began in 2007 saw an increased role of the G-20.241 The G-20 made use 
of the “IMF as an outsourced secretariat, research department  … and policy referee …”242  
and also practically outsourced the legitimacy of the IMF in the regulation of international 
monetary and financial matters. Since the IMF enjoys a near universal membership, a small 
group such as the G-20 can speak with a legitimate voice under the cover of the IMF. States 
displayed a high level of co-operation during the crisis on the realisation that the crisis 
threatened their own stability. The clandestine bailouts243 carried out by the federal reserve 
bank on Eurozone institutions was clearly a sign that acting in isolation would pose a serious 
threat to the interests of the USA as well. Due to the globalisation of financial and other 
markets, a collapse of the Euro currency would have adversely impacted the trading 
partners of Europeans states, of which the USA is a major one. 
The emergence of international institutions has seen a burgeoning of normative aspects of 
sovereignty to encompass human rights, a resurgence of popular sovereignty and a 
strengthening of democracy. 244 States have realised that some decisions are best taken at 
intergovernmental level so as to protect the broader economic interests. States sometimes 
conveniently delegate state power which they can still regain if they decide to withdraw from 
the institutions concerned.245 
 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the conceptual framework of monetary sovereignty and has 
contextualised it within the shifting perceptions and the emerging patterns of transnational 
interaction. The powers of the state to create money through deciding the name of the unit, 
the power to coin money and print notes, to set monetary standards and to declare legal 
tender, to determine exhange rates and to impose exchange controls are established 
competences of the state from which derogation cannot be easily entertained. 
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Having noted that most of the legal cases supporting the dominant position of the state were 
were decided during the era of the gold and other commodity anchors,246 it is worthwhile to 
ask whether adjudication of monetary disputes based on fiat standards should not adopt a 
different approach to those previously adopted. In light of the fact that ‘money is not what 
money used to be’, it is arguable that an international jurisprudence that departs from 
positivist ‘listings’ of state competences no longer serves the interests of commerce to a 
sufficient degree. The acknowledgement of the inadequacies of ‘unqualified state monetary 
power’ is the reason for the necessity of puting limits to the monetary sovereignty. The next 
chapter therefore discusses the juridical constraints that operate against monetary 
sovereignty.
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CHAPTER 4 
4. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters of this study dealt with the nature and the scope of monetary 
sovereignty within the context of a globalised economic system. The incidences of 
sovereignty were considered within the context of traditional and unfettered dimensions of 
monetary sovereignty. It emerged from the discussion that states traditionally enjoyed little or 
no limitations to the exercise of their sovereign powers. Lately, however, the increasing 
propensity towards international trade, international investment and the growth of global 
financial markets has resulted in dramatic encroachments into the hitherto unlimited area of 
state monopoly. Such monopoly has demonstrably waned, leaving the state with modest 
remnants of monetary power as compared to the previous times. 
This chapter looks at the juridical or legal constraints that have become part and parcel of 
international economic relations as well as their defining effects on the contours of monetary 
power. While it can be argued that most of the constraining factors are of a  purely economic 
nature such as those which emanate from market dynamics or political considerations, there 
are others which are strictly of a legal nature. Non-legal or de facto constraints are 
mentioned in passing while the de jure factors form the heart of the discussion. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is an exposition of the legal basis 
for the imposition of constraints on the exercise of state power. The second one reviews the 
customary public international law basis for the constraints while the third extensively 
discusses the role of treaties in constraining monetary sovereignty. Major multilateral treaties 
such as the IMF, the GATT and GATS and other organisations such as the OECD are 
reviewed in the context of their far reaching effects. BIT provisions also provide insightful 
guidelines on some of the approaches that have been adopted to control state discretion. 
The fourth section explores sovereignty saving devices that help to strike a balance between 
the need to limit the states’ power and the countries’ need for fall-back corrective measures 
in times of economic crisis. 
4.2. LEGAL BASIS FOR CONSTRAINTS  
In international law, there are primary as well as secondary rules. The primary rules are the 
ones that lay down “the content of obligations” and state the substantive rules to be invoked 
in solving a pertinent legal problem. Secondary rules on the other hand  lay down “the 
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general conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for 
wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom.”247 
Whereas primary rules pertinent to monetary law are specicific to the particular legal 
relationships and would apply narrowly within the monetary law sphere, secondary rules 
apply broadly as general principles applicable to international law problems in a general 
manner. Whether a state is liable for a breach of the international monetary law is a question 
than can be answered by looking at the content of the monetary law rules, which incidentally 
fall within the ambit of primary rules of monetary law. 
It was unveiled in chapter 3 that the determination of the value of a currency, the imposition 
and maintenance of exchange controls among others are competences perculiarly within the 
province of the state. It was also revealed that there are certain exceptions and limitations 
that constrain monetary sovereignty. Literature on international monetary law recognises two 
sources of limitations on state power. The two are customary public international law as well 
as treaty law.248 The remaining sections of the chapter discuss these limitations in their 
broader operational context beginning with customary law and then followed by treaty based 
exceptions. 
4.3. CONTOURS OF CUSTOMARY LAW CONSTRAINTS 
Customary public international law recognises several constraints that operate against 
monetary sovereignty. It recognises that a state has a duty not to abuse the rights of aliens 
through discrimination or otherwise. In the Zuk Claim case, the US Claims Commission 
acknowledged the aspect  of monetary sovereignty and further said;  
“International law recognizes two exceptions to this general rule. The first 
exception is founded on the theory of a denial of justice. … The second may be 
found in a provision in a treaty or other international agreement.”249  
Denial of justice is undeniably a customary law principle which is largely applied in municipal 
law and its application is extended to international law on the basis that it forms part of ”the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”250 An individual is deprived of 
justice when there is a deprivation of rights accompanied by denial of access to legal 
redress. If, for instance, a state deprives a foreign national of his rights through 
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nationalisation, expropriation or other forms of deprivation, the act is not necessarily deemed 
a deprivation unless the aggrieved foreign national is also denied adequate compensation 
and access to national courts. The insistence by international jurisprudence on the need for 
the exhaustion of national remedies251 shows that a finding of a denial of rights is not a 
matter that can be easily inferred. 
When a country undertakes currency valuations, imposes and maintains exchange controls 
and restrictions, imposes quantitative restrictions, alters its monetary standards or abrogates 
gold and other value clauses, it acts within its sovereign powers and its actions need not be 
questioned. Mere massive devaluations of currency are not sufficient to establish state 
liability.252 The measures, however, raise concern when their employment adversely affects 
the property interests of aliens particularly if such measures are discriminatory or in 
instances where the state fails to provide adequate compensation. Such failure amounts to 
an abuse of rights.253 Such cases of unjustifiable taking of property belonging to aliens may 
result in state responsibility in international law. Owing to the negative effect that 
discrimination can have on the monetary interests of aliens, it is important to consider how it 
can be a basis of state liability. 
4.3.1 DUTY OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN TREATMENT OF ALIENS 
Discrimination in international law is not wrongfull by itself. A mere finding that a state has 
acted in a discriminatory manner does not automatically give rise to state liability. As Shuster 
notes, “… the blanket proposition that a currency valuation, if it can be found to be 
discriminatory … will give rise to an international tort is incorrect.”254 What then is the basis 
of the action if discrimination is not a sufficient ground? An economic test is applied to 
determine when discrimination will be actionable.255 Discrimination is not actionable as 
against a state if the measures are adopted for bona fide and necessary economic 
adjustment purposes. Suffice it to note, however, that discrimination based on race, religion 
or sex is always unjustifiable unless there are exceptional grounds to excuse it. The Nazi 
practice of compelling the Jewish people to leave Germany while at the same time imposing 
measures to prevent international transfers of money was clearly discriminatory256 and such 
discrimination cannot be justified in international law. 
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If, however, one state, named A, enjoys a balance of trade surplus with state B and a trade 
deficit in relation to state C, state A may, as a corrective measure, impose exchange 
restrictions which discriminate against state C so as to stabilise its balance of payment 
account. The adoption of quantitative restrictions as a measure to reduce imports from state 
C has the effect of restricting monetary flows between the two states.257 If capital controls 
were to be maintained as between states A and C, the effect would be a dsicrimination 
against residents of state C as compared to those of state B. The restriction of payments 
does not arbitrarily target residents of state C, but is only employed for adjustment purposes. 
Regulatory measures that discriminate between foreign and domestic persons whose 
situations are substantially simillar can and should give rise to an international tort.258 
Discriminatory conduct as between aliens of different nationalities is also compensable 
unless there are other circumstances such as a treaty obligation between the state accused 
of discrimination and the third state, in which case the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)259 
clauses become operational. In the Tobacco Monopoly Bonds Case, discrimination based on 
nationality was apparent and was the basis for the challenge. When the state of Portugal 
offered payment in Pound Sterling, a form of preferential payment made to British nationals, 
the US objected.260 
The use of exchange restrictions may lead to an international tort if undertaken for sinister 
motives other than bona fide  monetary regulation.261 A state adopting such measures needs 
to carefully guard against injuring the interests of other states through any forms of untenable 
discrimination. International jurisprudence naturally prohibits arbitrariness262 and abusive 
employment of discriminatory measures. 
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4.3.2 ABUSE OF RIGHTS, INCURRING AN INTERNATIONAL TORT 
A state abuses the rights of foreign nationals when it expropriates their property without 
giving them adequate compensation.263 Compensation is adequate if it meets international 
standards of fair compensation which is “adequate, prompt and effective.”264 The application 
of the ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’ (MST) is essential for the protection of the monetary 
rights of aliens. Various international agreements adopt it so as to guarantee investment 
protection against the effects of expropriation.265 It sets “a baseline below which state 
conduct must not fall.”266 
The standard is “essentially similar to standards of justice and treatment accepted by 
civilised nations” and may even include a standard higher than the one that the state applies 
against its own nationals.267 In its development, the MST was juxtaposed with the “Calvo 
doctrine,” a doctrine which denies the granting of preferential treatment to foreigners as 
compared to nationals. The MST, instead, prefers an equal standard of protection for 
nationals and foreigners based on the sovereign equality of states and an premise that a 
state cannot interfer in the affairs of another. Another view is that the doctrine is a “rejection 
of superiority or imperial prerogatives of powerful states and their nationals.”268 Its operation 
in recent years has been neutralised by increased propensity towards greater levels of 
investment protection offered by BITs. Paradoxically, it has seen some resurgence in Latin 
America in recent years.269 The interconnection between the MST and other customary law 
principles is aptly expressed by Francioni who says: 
“So, in its historical evolution, access to justice is inseparable from the ‘ minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens’. This is confirmed by the customary rule requiring 
prior exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition of diplomatic protection. This 
rule presupposes the international obligation of every state to ensure access to 
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courts to aliens and to administer justice in accordance with minimum standards 
of fairness and due process.”270 
Francioni explains that ‘access’ to courts is a reference to the courts of the particular state 
concerned and not necessarily international tribunals. Whether the national standard of 
treatment offers adequate protection for aliens remains a grey area. It is certain, however, 
that international agreements have raised the bar, showing a preference for a minimum 
standard of treatment. 
4.3.3 NATIONALISATION, CONFISCATION, EXPROPRIATION, COMPULSORY 
LIQUIDATION OF PROPETY OF ALIENS TO BE DONE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF 
THE LAW 
A taking over by a host state, of property belonging to aliens amounts to a compensable 
deprivation of property unless it can be justified on grounds of necessity.271 Included under 
the rubric of takings are numerous forms such as expropriation, nationalisation or 
confiscation.272 These measures have varying effects on the monetary interests of aliens. In 
this study, the term ‘expropriation’ is adopted to refer to various take-overs of the monetary 
assets belonging to aliens. The measures may take direct or indirect approaches. Direct 
expropriation occurs when the state or a third party mandated by it, compulsorily acquires 
property belonging to an alien. States usually confiscate private property while pursuing 
public purposes. Indirect expropriation, on the other hand, occurs in ways that are not overt 
hence such descriptions of the measures as ‘creeping’, ‘constructive’, or ‘disguised’273 
expropriation. 
It is unusual for states to openly expropriate property belonging to aliens. As a result, the 
most common forms of expropriation are indirect or disguised. Indirect expropriations, 
creeping nationalisation or disguised measures are difficult to prove because of their 
concealed nature. Whether a taking of property is compensable or not can raise questions of 
applicable standards of which two have attained dominance. The balancing of the two 
emergent standards namely, the “effects” doctrine and “police” powers doctrine274 is set to 
bring about a balance between the diametrically opposing interests of the state and those of 
the alien investor. In terms of the “effects” doctrine, “if a governmental measure deprives the 
owner of control over his property or substantially affects its commercial value, 
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compensation is required ...”275 This is the case even if the state claims to have adopted the 
said measure in order to carry out its police powers. The “police” powers doctrine on the 
other hand holds that if a regulatory measure is “taken for a legitimate public purpose and is 
not discriminatory, the measure … does not give rise to the right to compensation.”276 
The “sole effects doctrine” was applied by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal which held that: 
“… measures taken by a state can interfere with property rights to such an extent 
that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriated, even though the state does not purport to have expropriated them 
and the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner. 277 
Customary international law principles hold that expropriations must be carried out for a 
public purpose, must follow the due process of the law, must be non-discriminatory and 
accompanied by adequate compensation.278 The principles bolster the argument that 
expropriatory government measures must at least be subject to some form of control. 
 
4.3.4 EFFECTS OF CONTRACTS ON MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY 
A question may be asked whether a contract concluded between a state and a private party 
has an effect of limiting monetary sovereignty. If a state, ex post facto changes its monetary 
law, invokes its sovereignty and invalidates the contract lawfully concluded to the detriment 
of the other contracting party, a question arises whether such exercise of power is legitimate. 
Unilaterally changing the contract runs against the principle that: 
 “a state cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard commitments freely 
undertaken through the exercise of the same sovereignty and cannot, through 
measures belonging to to its internal order, make null and void the rights of the 
contracting party”279. 
There is a convincing counter-proposition that sovereignty cannot be signed away in terms of 
a contract.280 The state retains sovereignty even under such circumstances but can be held 
to account on the basis of pacta sunt servanda. The principles applicable in terms of the law 
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of contract bind the state to the terms of the contract but its sovereignty remains untouched. 
However, since a foreign individual does not have international legal personality, every 
contract between a state and the individual is subject to the law of the contracting state.281 
The conclusion of a contract does not negate the operation of sovereignty. As an example, a 
contract to purchase sovereign bonds is governed by the law of the issuing state. In the 
Certain Norwegian Loans case, the governement of France argued: 
“That undertakings as to the amount of the debts contracted under the said loans 
by the Norwegian State with French nationals, containing express conditions as 
to performance, cannot be unilaterally modified by that State without negotiation 
with the holders.”282 
Having initially undertaken to discharge the obligation in terms of “gold value of the coupons”, 
the Kingdom of Norway’s unilateral variation of contractual terms was being seriously 
questioned by the French. The argument advanced by the French government is 
unconvincing, much as it questioned the exercise of sovereign power by the Kingdom of 
Norway. The Kingdom of Norway rightly argued that the matter was not an international legal 
dispute but was exclusively within its national jurisdiction. This alteration of terms was 
certainly a breach of contract  and the application of pacta sunt servanda  would have been 
more appropriate under the circumstances. 
 
4.4. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER SPECIFIC LEGAL REGIMES 
The impact of treaty regimes on sovereignty since the end of the Second World War, has 
been exceedingly great. Treaties have imposed numerous limitations on state power and 
have drastically constrained monetary sovereignty. A treaty by treaty analysis of provisions 
follows below. It is very important however to sound an alarm of caution that rules of 
monetary conduct emanating from treaties do not “express universally binding duties” but 
are only binding to the contracting parties.283 
4.4.1 IMF ARTICLES AND THEIR CONSTRAINING EFFECT ON SOVEREIGNTY 
The International Monetary Fund is by far the the most globally representative institution as 
regards monetary regulation. Its membership consists of 188 states which gives its 
regulatory role a great deal of influence. Its legal provisions seriously encroach into the 
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sovereignty of the states. The IMF provisions which have  a great bearing on sovereignty are 
Articles IV, VI, VII, VIII, XIV and the definitions in Article XXX(d). The scopes and 
applications of these provisions are discussed below. This study evaluates the validity of an 
argument that the operation of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF causes little curtailment 
to sovereignty.284 Article IV plays a very central role in monetary relations.  It is a general 
undertaking by the members to co-operate in bringing about “a stable system of exchange 
rates.”285 The current version of Article IV, which came into effect in 1978 following the 
second ammendment of the Articles of the Agreement, spells out the “obligations regarding 
exchange arrangements.”286 Unlike its predecessor, it is based on ‘discretionary judgment’ of 
the IMF instead of ‘rules’.287 The par value system set rigid rules which made the adjustment 
of the monetary system very difficult.288 An ‘undertaking to collaborate,’ or an ‘endeavour to 
direct’ economic policies is certainly not a way to spell out rigidly enforceable obligations. 
Terms that vaguely state the obligations largely leave the “sovereignty and discretion of 
member states almost completely intact.”289 Consultations in terms of Article IV(1)(iii) aim to 
avoid the manipulation of exchange rates while the allegations of exchange rate 
manipulations would only flow from a violation of this Article.290 ‘Soft obligations’ are placed 
side by side with ‘forceful obligations’ in what Lastra labels a “hesitant tone.”291 The former 
are stated in relatively apologetic words while the latter express absolute imperatives 
couched in uncompromising parlance.  
Article IV consultations provide vital information for the IMF to formulate policy 
transformations and in cases of violations of members’ obligations, the IMF may impose 
sanctions in terms of Article XXVI(2). The “elimination of exchange restrictions” is clearly an 
important goal of the IMF.292 Members determine exchange arrangements in terms of Article 
IV(2)(b) which leaves members the discretion to apply  … (iii) “other exchange arrangements 
of a member’s choice.” However, the freedom of a member to alter its exchange rate regime 
is subject to the requirement for a prompt notification to the fund. The Article forms the basis 
for surveillance over the exchange rates and when read in conjunction with Article XXVI(2), it 
imposes a manifest constraint on sovereignty. The application of the conditionality principle, 
however, does not cause a dimunition of sovereignty because it is not a mandatory 
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provision. Instead, it only operates against a member that seeks to borrow from the fund.293 
Lastra defines conditionality as “the policies and procedures developed by the fund to 
govern the access to and use of its resources by member countries.”294 
Monetary sovereignty endures some serious curtailment from the operation of the 
Agreement of IMF.295 It imposes substantial fetters on a state’s policy space by stating that: 
“Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 
2, no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on 
the making of payments and transfers for current international 
transactions.”296 
Fund approval is a pre-requisite for the imposition of restrictions on current payments and 
transfers. Under certain circumstances, however, the Fund may permit the imposition of 
restrictions. Current transactions are payments for goods and services rendered while 
capital transactions are concerned with transfers for investments whether on a short or long 
term basis.297 A current transaction is defined in Article XXX(d) of the agreement of the IMF 
as a transaction which is “not for the purpose of transfering capital.” It gives a list of 
transactions including payments in connection with foreign trade. Examples are payments 
for goods or services purchased or services rendered. Inflows and outflows carried out for 
the purposes of investment are classified as capital transactions but the list includes 
transactions which economic theory sometimes classifies as capital transactions.298 These 
are “payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments,” and 
“payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct 
investments.” Proceeds from partial or full liquidation of an investment are also included in 
the definition. The limitation on state power to restrict such payments is clearly demarcated. 
The provision encumbers sovereignty to a great extent much as the choices of the state are 
made to depend on the approval of an international organisation. The burden is, however, 
only imposed as regards current transactions for which there is a greater level of protection 
than there is for capital ones. The power of the state to deal with capital transactions and to 
even impose controls enjoys a great measure of latitude. Members of the IMF are still 
permitted to maintain capital controls in terms of Article VI(3) of the IMF. 
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It is moreover noteworthy that exchange controls are different from restrictions.299 Controls 
are less burdensome measures than restrictions. The former are governmental regulatory 
processes that merely inconvenience international payments and transfers through delays 
and other forms of nuisance. However, they do not totally prevent the payments. They may 
include administrative processes designed to obtain information or to ensure compliance 
with application procedures to obtain a foreign exchange licence. Shuster explains that 
controls do not prevent the payment300 as such. The term ‘exchange controls’ is a much 
broader concept than ‘exchange restriction’. It is  broadly inclusive of “any governmental 
action, whether of a formal or informal nature, that impedes the making of current 
international payments and transfers”.301 The measure is a restriction if while permitting 
transfers and payments nevertheless “increases their cost or subjects them to an 
unreasonable burden or delay’.302 Having noted these perceptions of the terms, it is 
significant to contextualise the terms by admitting, as Gari does that: 
“…the terms ‘capital control’ are not a legal term of art. The legal meaning of 
terms related to the concept of capital control can only be established in light of 
their context and the object and purpose of the agreement that contains them.”303 
A member state wishing to restrict current transactions must obtain IMF approval before 
doing so. But precisely under what circumstances such approval will be granted to permit a 
state to impose restrictions on payments under Article VIII(2)(a) is far from clear. An IMF 
Decision summarises the circumstances as follows; 
“ … the Fund will grant approval only where it is satisfied that the measures are 
necessary and that their use will be temporary while the member is seeking to 
eliminate the need for them. … the use of exchange systems for nonbalance of 
payments reasons should be avoided to the greatest possible extent, …”304 
The circumstances of the state must be such that it is absolutely necessary to temporarily  
impose the restrictive measures. There must be evidence that the state is seeking 
alternative and more sustainable ways to deal with the problem at hand. As Gold 
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convincingly affirms, “The IMF's practice is to grant approval, when justifiable, for a limited 
period only because the restrictions are derogations.”305 
There are instances where a state may choose to apply trade measures in order to deal with 
an exchange crisis. This becomes possible because the effects of exchange and trade 
measures on the balance of payment position of a state are similar.306 Trade measures can 
also be applied to adjust balance of payment accounts with the same effects. Drawing a 
distinction between an exchange and a trade measure is, however, a daunting task.307 An 
IMF determination is that, “The guiding principle in ascertaining whether a measure is a 
restriction on payments and transfers for current transactions under Article VIII(2), is whether 
it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such.”308 
If it does not involve foreign exchange, it may be a trade restriction instead of an exchange 
restriction. A distinguishing feature of a trade action is that it involves the underlying 
transaction such as the maximum quantity of a particular class of goods that can be 
imported or exported by a country. 
It is possible for states to circumvent the Articles of Agreement of the IMF through the use of 
trade measures such as quantitative restrictions and still not be in contravention of the IMF 
Articles of Agreement.309 The IMF legal regime therefore works in collaboration with the 
GATT so as to effectively310 fulfill its mandate. Quantitative restrictions fall under the 
jurisdiction of the GATT and the implications of their adoption are discussed below. 
In the context of this study, Article VIII(2)(b) of the IMF receives a cursory reference as it is a 
private international law or conflict of laws rule311 which shields exchange control regulations 
of a member from being rendered inoperative in territories of other members. For the 
regulations to receive protection, their maintenance must be consistent with the IMF 
Agreement. It reads as follows: 
“Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are 
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed 
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consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any 
member.”312 
As far as Article VIII(2)(b) is concerned, an IMF Decision says, “By accepting the Fund 
Agreement, members have undertaken to make the principle mentioned above effectively 
part of their national law.”313 It places a negative obligation on member states to give effect 
in their territories to fellow members’ exchange control regulations.314 It protects the 
sovereign power of a state with regards to adoption of regulations while securing the power 
of the state to exercise discretion within its territory. 
On the other hand, Article VIII(3) of the IMF greatly constrains sovereignty as it categorically 
prohibits the adoption of discriminatory and multiple currency practices. A multiple currency 
practice exists when official action causes exchange or cross rate spreads to differ by more 
than 2 percent between buying and selling rates for spot exchange transactions between a 
member’s currency and currency of any other member.315 Such a practice discriminates 
between transactions and distorts trade to the extent that certain transactions are placed at 
an exchange advantage as compared to others. The prohibition  narrows the margin of 
manoeuvre and levels the field for all transactions. 
Sovereignty has been significantly constrained by the IMF law. A determination regarding 
the legal obligations of a state now has to take into account the implications of the IMF law 
on the state concerned. The connection between the IMF and the WTO regime is another 
critical area of great interest and the matter is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.4.2 RECOURSE TO THE WTO REGULATORY TOOLKIT TO NEUTRALISE 
UNORTHODOX USE OF TRADE MEASURES 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), constisting of a number of agreements such as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  the General Agreement of Trade in 
Services (GATS), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), is a highly influential monetary legal regime.  
As discussed above, the IMF mostly regulates exchange measures but restricts the abuse of 
trade measures by states. Abuse occurs when states employ measures that affect 
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underlying transactions as a way to adjust balance of payment positions.316 States often 
devise numerous measures to disguise exchange restrictions. Import surcharges,317 
retention quotas, advance deposits, taxations on the purchases of foreign currency tend to 
frustrate trade liberalisation.318 States exploit the Fund’s lack of direct influence on trade 
measures and maintain quantitative or financial barriers in a manner that frustrates efforts to 
attain the goals of trade liberalisation. Tariffs, export duties, taxes on transfers, export or 
import quotas319 can be employed in a way that violates states’ international obligations. The 
role of Article XV of the GATT as a bridge between the GATT and the IMF legal regimes,320 
is relevant in ensuring that trade measures do not frustrate the goals of exchange 
convertibility.321 It pre-empts a circumvention of Article VIII:2a of the IMF by stating  that: 
“Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the 
provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of 
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.”322 
Article XVIII(2) of the GATT expressly permits states to “to apply quantitative restrictions for 
balance of payments purposes” while carrying out programes and policies of economic 
development.323 In the India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products324 case, the state of India adopted quantitative restrictions for balance of 
payment purposes and came under US challenge for the decision. According to the 
determination by the WTO panel, the restrictions were inconsistent with Articles XV(1) and 
XVIII(11). The consultative relationship between the IMF and the GATT operates with the 
effect of avoiding abuse of exchange and trade measures. The two legal regimes act in a 
complementary relationship to prevent evasion of obligations in either regime. Together they 
constrain monetary sovereignty in a substantial manner. 
Yet, as compared to the IMF, the GATS system goes a step further in liberalising capital 
movements. The GATS aims mainly to liberalise trade in services and lays the ground rules 
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for market access that one state grants to the others.325 Each state undertakes commitments 
based on a specific schedule in terms of which it spells out market access modes for the 
service sectors it liberalises. Depending on the mode of supply326 chosen, the state 
undertakes capital account liberalisation commensurate with the mode of market access 
selected for the particular service. Since commitments are  based on individual state 
negotiations,327 the obligations of the state towards others also vary from state to state. 
There are basically four modes of supply to choose from, namely cross-border supply of 
services, consumption abroad, foreign commercial presence and lastly, movement of natural 
persons328 The Articles of the GATS clearly spell out that: 
“each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member 
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations 
and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.”329  
In terms of footnote 8 of the Articles, a state granting market access in terms of mode 1 must 
liberalise capital flows ‘essential’ for the supply of the service. With regards to mode 3, the 
state must liberalise all 'related’ capital flows. The nature of the service as well as the 
chosen mode of supply therefore determine the extent of capital movement liberalisation. It 
is significant therefore at this point to accentuate that the GATS commitments, once 
undertaken, do constrain sovereignty in a substantial way. 
The power to apply restrictions on international transfers is limited by Article XI(1) of the 
GATS which states that a “member shall not apply restrictions on international transfers and 
payments for current transactions relating to its specific commitments”  and that a “member 
shall not impose restrictions on any capital transactions inconsisently with its specific 
commitments regarding such transactions, except under Article XII …”330 Reference to 
‘schedules of specific commitments’ shows the importance of negotiations and 
commitments331 in demarcating the boundaries of capital account liberalisation. In the case 
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of United States-Measures Affecting the cross-border supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, the panel said: 
“Indeed, the value of specific commitments on market access and national 
treatment would be seriuosly impaired if Members could restrict international 
transfers and payment for service transactions in scheduled sectors.”332 
It is apparent, therefore, that numerous provisions within the WTO regime significantly 
constrain the monetary power of contracting state parties. Provisions within the GATT legal 
regime such as Article XV are instrumental in regulating the use of trade measures as well 
as in providing the essential bridge between the WTO and the IMF.333 Articles XI, XII, and 
XVI of GATS, read in conjunction with Article I, help delimit the extent of capital account 
liberalisation for each member.  
 
4.4.3 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international 
organisation consisting of mostly high-income countries.334 It has two codes of liberalisation 
namely the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (Capital Code) and  the Code of 
Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations (Current Code).335 The OECD Capital  Code 
gives an item by item list336 of the covered transactions. 
Its Article I(a) states that “Members shall progresively abolish between one another … 
restrictions on movements of capital to the extent necessary for effective economic co-
opration.” Clearly this liberalisation of capital movements is more progressive than that 
accorded by Article VI(3) of the IMF. The Capital Code removes obstacles impeding capital 
movements so as to ensure efficient co-operation.337 Proceeds from investments or those 
from a full or partial liquidation of a business are liberalised in a broader way than the IMF 
system does. As a result, the constraint upon monetary sovereignty, particularly with regards 
to capital movements is relatively more drastic than that exercised by the IMF. 
The OECD does not enjoy the same universality of membership as the IMF, but attains great  
influence by extending the benefits of its liberalisation to IMF members. Arguably,  
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“the two OECD codes on capital liberalization have also played a major role in 
promoting international capital movements to an extent that goes well beyond 
what would be required under the Fund’s Articles.”338 
The Codes, however, provide very significant sovereignty saving measures through the 
employment of derogation clauses. In each code, Article 7 provides for derogation from 
obligations in the event of an economic and financial situation that justifies such a course,339 
or if the measures adopted in terms of the code lead to a serious economic and financial 
disturbance,340 or to correct an unfavourable balance of payment position.341 Other important 
saving provisions are Article 2b, dealing with reservations and Article 3, dealing with public 
order and security considerations. 
 
4.4.4 BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
The period since the 1950s has seen a proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)342 
sometimes called International Investment Agreements (IIA). They aim at the protection of 
foreign investments and usually have clauses which prohibit any forms of arbitrary 
discrimination based on subjective factors such as nationality. States pledge adequate 
investor compensation in the event of expropriation while also offering “guarantees on the 
transfer of capital and investment returns …”343 The guarantees are based on a “broad 
principle of customary law and equity that a Governement which has approved the 
importation of capital is bound to approve its re-exportation.”344 The treaties usually define 
the transactions that qualify for their regulatory protection.  
The treaties also provide for grievance procedures such as arbitration before a neutral 
tribunal345 in the event of a dispute between the state and the foreign investor. They 
augment investor protection in the face of inadequate provision for funds transfer under the 
IMF system.346  Although some remittances of investment related capital are done in terms 
of Article XXX(d) of the IMF, read in conjunction with VIII(2)(a), proceeds from a full or partial  
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liquidation of an investment do not enjoy the same degree of protection.347 This is hardly 
surprising since investment protection is not an expressely stated purpose of the IMF. BITs, 
therefore, have a significant impact on sovereignty because their clauses severely curtail the 
state’s monetary power. As Mann states, they “are far less modest than the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund”348 in constraining monetary sovereignty. 
Most of them impose a duty to transfer capital across jurisdictions while firmly prohibiting the 
use of exchange restrictions. Article VI(3) of the IMF, which permits the use of capital 
controls and restrictions has in the face of these provisions become “hollow”349 and of little 
operative consequence. 
Capital repatriation is secured through clauses that guarantee currency convertibility, spell 
out methods of determining the exchange rate as well as stimulate a prompt transfer of 
capital.350 They spell out how payments should be made in a freely ‘convertible currency,’351 
or the currency in which the investment was initially made. Some recommend payments in a 
freely usable currency or any other currency that parties agree to.352 Clauses that allow for 
payment in the original currency of investment are clearly less restrictive to state power than 
the others. According to the Netherlands-United Arab Emirates treaty, “The transfers shall be 
made in freely convertible currency, without restriction or delay.”353 It liberalises the payment 
of profits, interests, dividends and current income, funds necessary for acquisition of raw 
materials, replacement of capital assets or to safeguard the continuity or development of 
investment, funds for loan repayments, royalties, fees earnings of natural persons and 
proceeds of sale and liquidation of investment. Its constraining effect on sovereignty is 
clearly more than that of the IMF Articles as it ensures a greater degree of liberalisation of 
capital inflows and outflows of capital. 
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 The choice of currency and the method to determine the applicable exchange rate are 
among the most critical concerns to an investor.354 The UK-Chile Agreement provides that 
“transfers shall be made at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of transfer …”355 
Some treaties prefer the application of a “prevailing market rate.”356 The clauses are 
formulated in such a way as to avert the manipulation of exchange rates. Phrases such as 
“without delay” appear very frequently in BITs in relation to the ‘time of transfer’ clause. 
Some BITs employ terms that restrict repatratriation of proceeds before the lapsing of certain 
time periods such as one year. Of such terms, Gari says; 
“Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) is a requirement applicable to non-
residents consisting of a mandatory deposit of a percentage of their investment in 
a Central Bank account, not remunerated and for a minimum period of time.”357  
Without doubt, such clauses unduly restrict repatriation of capital. 
In light of the above exposition, it is a conceivable deduction that BITs have advanced ahead 
of other regulatory regimes in curtailing monetary sovereignty. States which commit 
themselves to BITs clearly limit their sovereignty as far as covered investments are 
concerned. 
Regional economic groupings or blocs also play a considerably important role with respect to 
international monetary regulation. One oustanding example is the European Union which 
performs a highly important regulatory function within the subcontinent of Europe. Regional 
economic groups complement the works of the multilateral systems through the creation of 
monetary unions and common currency areas. Monetary unions and currency areas358 
promote co-operation at regional levels even though their members still retain obedience to 
the global regulatory bodies. 
4.5. SOVEREIGNTY SAVING PROVISIONS UNDER VARIOUS REGIMES 
Even though bilateral and multilateral agreements have made gross and far reaching 
encroachments on national sovereignty, the state still enjoys a great measure of latitude 
within which to regulate its own affairs. State sovereignty has been saved by some 
conservative  treaty provisions and other innovations. Among such provisions are transitional 
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arrangements,359 reservations,360 derogations, prudential carve-out clauses361 as well as 
balance of payment derogations.362 
In terms of Article VI(1) of the IMF, “the Fund may request a member to exercise capital 
controls in order to prevent”363 any abuse of the Fund’s resources. This article particularly 
applies to those states that borrow or receive financial resources from the IMF. The IMF 
further authorises states to “exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international 
capital movements,”364 provided the controls do not “restrict payments for current 
transactions.”365 In cases where a state experiences a sustained outflow of resources, 
restrictions may be approved.366 Capital controls play a particularly important role in 
preventing volatile capital flows, seen as “the principal conduit for the transmission of global 
shocks.”367  In light of the fact that the state may, on the approval of the Fund, impose 
exchange restrictions,368 and also  maintain limitations on foreign exchange especially as a 
response to a problem of currency scarcity,369 it is a reasonable deduction that states still do 
enjoy a substantial measure of sovereignty. 
One part of the IMF law that poses a severe challenge to the efforts to liberalise the global 
monetary system is Article VI(3). It permits members to “exercise such controls as are 
necessary to regulate international capital movements,” without unduly restricting payments 
for current transactions. States are thus practically free to adopt controls and restrictions on 
capital flows provided they do not cause any delays in transfers of funds to settle their 
commitments.370 Article XIV(2), a transitional provision, permits the maintenance of 
exchange controls and restrictions by those states which still avail themselves to its 
protection. The restrictions already in operation at the date of attaining membership are 
maintained and gradually phased out once their necesity falls away.371 
As Viterbo explains, the regulation of current and capital transactions by the IMF is 
asymmetric in nature.372 While IMF approval is mandatory before the imposition of 
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restrictions to current transactions, none is required for a restriction of capital transactions.373 
It has been argued that the IMF legal regime regulates the current account while the capital 
account lies outside its jurisdiction.374 The asymmetry results from states’ right to impose 
capital controls in terms of Article VI of the  IMF.375 The regulation of capital controls lies 
within the competent powers of the state. Cohen aptly highlights the fact that “there is 
nothing to prevent a sovereign government from limiting capital flows if it so chooses …”376 
The revision of the IMF's Articles through the adoption of the second amendment did not 
extend the IMF regulatory jurisdiction over movements of capital.377 It has been asked 
whether the inclusion of words “exchange of goods, services and capital  among countries” 
in the preamble of the ammended Article IV of the IMF extended the organisation’s 
jurisdiction over the capital account.378 It is a cogent inference that the recent proposal to 
further ammend the articles379 was meant to bring capital account liberalisation within the 
IMF  jurisdiction, a sign that the IMF itself was not satisfied with the extent of its jurisdiction 
as regards capital controls. 
The debate on the supposed benefits of capital account liberalisation rages on among 
academics. Stiglitz, among others, argues that liberalisation will not benefit national and 
global systems. He argues that there is no evidence that capital-market liberalisation would 
be good for countries on which it is imposed?”380 Following the East-Asia financial crisis of 
the late 1990s and Malaysia’s successful adoption of capital controls to curb capital flight, 
conventional thinking shifted away from outright fascination with financial liberalisation on the 
grounds that unlimited liberalisation may lead to systemic risk.381 At the formation of the IMF 
in 1945, Keynes, a leading economic theorist of the time showed much revulsion for free 
capital movements, expressing concern that uncontrollably volatile cross-border surges of 
‘speculative capital’, ‘refuge capital’ as well as ‘hot moneys’ would be disruptive to national 
economies.382 
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Attitudes, however shifted as more and more theorists began to place emphasis on 
‘financialisation’383 of national economies. At the beginning the 1980s, many advocated for 
capital account liberalisation but the recent crises of 1997 in East-Asia and the post-2007 
global contraction sounded warning sirens that liberalisation may not be an excellent idea 
afterall. In an article with a seemly title, Kelsey speaks of “the conundrum of shifting 
orthodoxies” in reference to how states have been straddling between two opposing views 
regarding capital account regulation.384 
At the centre of the debate is a towering imperative to develop a multilateral legal framework 
dedicated to capital account regulation so as to achieve greater global instability.385 Even 
though a drive emerged in 1997 towards the ammendment of the Articles of the IMF to give 
it direct and comprehensive jurisdiction over capital requirements, the proposal lost 
momentum after the East-Asia crisis.386 The argument that capital account liberalisation 
could have a destabilising effect reverberated with even greater resonance.387 More than 
ever before, a view crystalised that “capital controls are a legitimate part of the toolkit to 
manage capital inflows in certain circumstances”388. Yet paradoxically, the need for a 
coordinated regulation of capital movements is in some circles still being proposed as a 
response to the 2007-2010 global crisis .389 
A prudential ‘carve-out’ also plays an important function of protecting national economies 
from the effects of systemic risk or shock. In defining prudential measures, Pasini says: 
 “Prudential measures consist of regulations that aim at limiting the systemic risk 
on financial institutions in relation to cross-border flows. The risk is usually 
associated with the exposure of financial institutions to foreign currencies’ 
fluctuations.”390 
It is apparent, therefore, that these measures regulate factors of systemic significance and 
are designed to curb spillover effects or the spread of shock across the national and global 
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economic structures. They may operate in ways that are contrary to states’ ‘specific 
commitments’ under the GATS system.391 Prudential measures are distinguishable from 
capital controls392 on the basis of how they function. In some instances, a “prudential carve-
out grants a wide policy space in which to restrict capital movements in the presence of a 
threat to financial stability.”393 Carve-outs provide states with regulatory breathing space in 
light of substantial constraints imposed by international agreements. They help preserve a 
modicum of sovereignty394 even though they are sometimes invoked to justify 
protectionism.395  
The Balance of payment clauses, normally built into multilateral and bilateral treaties, are 
highly significant in preseving state sovereignty.396 Article XI section 1 of the GATS states 
that: 
 “[i]n the event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties 
or threat thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain restrictions on trade in 
services on which it has undertaken specific commitments, including on 
payments or transfers for transactions related to such commitments.”397 
The capacity of treaty provisions such as transitional arrangements, carve-out and  
derogation clauses in preserving sovereignty is, however, limited because they “are subject 
to a number of substantive and procedural conditions.”398 Inspite of the effect of the 
substantive and procedural conditions, the state can still invoke the provisions whenever its 
economic stability is being threatened. 
4.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The discussion in this chapter has established the basis for juridical constraints on monetary 
sovereignty. Two bases, namely, customary public international law principles and the treaty 
provisions have been identified. An exploration of customary public international was 
undertaken first, followed by treaty based constraints. Although customary law principles 
play a modest role in this area of law, they still set the minimum standards of treatment that 
one may expect in the absence of express treaty provisions. The constraining role of treaties 
on the other hand is far more substantial and clearer than that of customary rules. Since 
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treaty provisions are more than mere re-statements of the customary provisions, their effect 
on sovereignty is more drastic than that of the former. Provisions from different treaties tend 
to safeguard common goals and interests. Their collective effects are complementary. 
The pivotal roles played by various multilateral treaty regimes, among them the IMF, the 
GATT and the GATS, the OECD, as well as BITs have been highlighted. Issues such as the 
prohibition of exchange restrictions and exchange rate manipulations as well as the 
promotion of international payments and transfers across national frontiers are central to 
international economic law. The discussion also highlighted the ongoing debate regarding 
the liberalisation of capital and current payments. While the IMF regime has attained 
comprehensive liberalisation of current payments and transfers, its ‘hands-off’ approach to 
issues of capital transfers has resulted in an asymmetric approach to regulation, a matter 
that continues to engage legal scholarship and is set to do so for a long time to come. 
The need to uphold a balance between the need for national economic stability, on the one 
hand, and the liberalisation of trade, investment and the capital account liberalisation on the 
other, demostrates a need for legal provisions that promote liberalisation while at the same 
time guarding the national economy from the adverse effects of unmonitored liberalisation. 
The liberal nature of most BITs and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) has made the states 
more vulnerable to litigation especially with regards to the covered investments.399 Free 
capital transfer provisions “offer foreign investors the possibility of suing host states before 
international tribunals for the breach of these provisions.”400 The absence of properly 
designed safeguards enhances the vulnerability of states who have to uphold commitments 
even when the effect of doing so would be detrimental to their economies. 
The existence of sovereignty saving mechanisms is a very important factor which 
underscores the extent to which the onslaught against sovereignty receives some tempering, 
thereby keeping its effects within modest extents. The next chapter of this study is a 
synthesis of the main issues discussed in the other chapters. It considers how the juridical 
constraints on mometary sovereignty affect the states in light of concrete cases of litigation 
that have sprung up, taking occasion of states’ restricted margin of manouvre. It explores the 
implications of the constraints in the context of international law’s sovereigty limiting 
features.
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CHAPTER 5 
5 IMPLICATIONS OF JURIDICAL CONSTRAINTS FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study has so far identified the constraints that operate against the exercise of full-
fledged monetary sovereignty of states. It is the purpose of this chapter to identify the 
implications of these limitations in light of how they shape the legal relations and obligations. 
Some states have been sued for breach of treaty obligations which constrain sovereignty in 
a substantial manner. The legal disputes have been handled mostly by arbitral tribunals and 
the consequences to the respondent states have been drastic.  A case by case review of 
some of the disputes reveals how investor-state arbitral tribunals pass verdicts whereby 
investor interests have prevailed over the sovereignty. This chapter, therefore, ponders the 
question regarding how some constraints have shaped and continue to shape the way in 
which role players and functionaries interact on the international economic plane as well as 
how the law needs to evolve so as to meet the dynamic needs of the commerce. 
The legal relationships affected by the constraints are the focal point of this discussion which 
also attempts to illustrate how the peculiarities of each relationship determine the responses   
adopted in order to satisfy the demands of the particular situation. 
 
5.2 DIVERGENT INTEREST GROUPS AND PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGN 
RESTRICTION 
The broad area of concern involves numerous interest groups, each of which is motivated 
differently in its consideration of issues regarding monetary sovereignty. There are interest 
groups that are directly affected by the way international economic law functions. These are 
the traders and investors, mainly saddled with concerns about securing their monetary 
interests and the guarantees of payment for the goods and services delivered. The state is 
another interest entity whose concerns border on the strategic choices its needs to make 
while carrying out its daily duty to legislate without fetters.401 It also needs to make provisions 
for sufficient policy space while executing its mandate to govern particular territory to the 
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satisfaction of the demands of the citizenry. Another crucial interest group is the international 
community whose goals, among others, encompass the securing of a stable global 
system.402 It is constituted by the different states and it is motivated towards protecting the 
benefits of international trade and investment. The growing incidence of investor-state 
disputes403 certainly places onerous burdens on the host states  amid calls for a revision of 
the investment agreement concerned.404 
The perceived benefits of foreign direct investment in stimulating national development have 
led to an increase in the number of international treaties signed between states.405 As a 
result, the alleged breaches of these investment treaties have  been the basis for the 
numerous investor-state arbitral disputes.406 While it remains an important pursuit of these 
agreements to protect the investors, the pursuit of this legitimate objective has resulted in 
inconsistent decisions and interpretations of the treaties.407 The powers of the state to apply 
regulatory measures have been circumscribed to the point of constraining the power of the 
state to achieve its legitimate policy objectives.408 
It is expedient therefore to craft international agreements in such a way as not to unduly 
burden the state through treaty provisions that overly restrict its margin of manoeuvre in the 
event of any need for the application of corrective strategies.409 Instead, the needs of the 
international economic community would best be served by a system that is sensitive to the 
needs of states whose mandate is to provide services to their citizens.410 One of the 
developments of the recent decades was dominance of ‘neo-liberalism’ and its entrenched 
belief in the power of markets to ‘self-regulate’ and ‘self-correct’.411 This emphasis, which 
came at the expense of national sovereignty, led to the signing of investment agreements 
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that elevated the rights of investors above the state’s duty to legislate, a development that 
has been appropriately termed ‘regulatory chill.”412 
The influence of some large corporates is a very important factor in shaping the terms of the 
BITs. Enjoying the advantage of their powerful domestic backing, the large corporates and 
transnational corporations have the ability to lobby for the entrenchment of their interests 
and can influence governments during the drafting of model BITs.413 Rent seeking interests 
have the capacity to influence government and affluent groups often use their influential 
positions to push for BIT terms that are favourable to their interests.414 All this comes at the 
expense of sovereignty and manifests itself through the attenuation of the powers of the 
state to regulate the environment and to promote development.415 Capital exporting 
countries, which happen to have a dominant position by virtue of their superior economic 
status, usually have the opportunity to dangle the proverbial carrot of ‘investment capital’ 
before the less developed countries.416 Because the latter are usually desperate for 
investment, they, without proper calculation, sign investment agreements whose terms are 
adverse to their future developmental needs. 
In drawing up treaties, it is important to strike a balance between the need to protect 
investment with the need to preserve sufficient regulatory space for the state to ably deal 
with emergencies and crises.417 Capital controls and exchange rate management are 
essential elements of the macro-economic management tool-kit to deal with unexpected 
surges in capital movements as well as financial speculation.418 One of the facts to emerge 
from the post-2007 global financial crisis was that massive speculation had played a critical 
role in its genesis and as such it becomes vital for states to put in place some measures so 
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as to curb such speculation.419 However, if the state has undertaken restrictive international 
commitments, controlling such problems may be seriously frustrated.420 
While there used to be an almost neat distinction between private and public international 
law,421 the recent proliferation of investment agreements has narrowed the divide in such a 
way that roles and functions have come to a point of overlap.422 There has been a significant 
blurring of the divide between public and the private law.423 Investors have, in some BITs, 
been empowered to enforce the rights contained in the treaties through tribunals and the 
beneficiaries of such a development are their home countries.424 Some BITs make use of 
elaborate provisions regarding arbitration as a result of which there has been a significant 
rise in the incidence of investment disputes handled by organisations such as the World 
Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNICITRAL) among others.425  What further  
complicates the issue is that, until recently, the claimant investors usually belonged to 
developed countries while the states being sued were mostly developing ones.426 
Karl makes a highly remarkable observation by noting how treaties limit the sovereignty of 
contracting state parties”427 to the point of restricting their powers to effectively pass 
monetary legislation. The observation also goes far enough to point out that states still retain 
a great measure of autonomy since they are “the ‘masters of the treaties’ they conclude.”428 
They reserve the freedom to pull out of burdensome treaties if they need to.429 That precisely 
implies that the power to determine how a state is affected by a treaty still lies within realm of 
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the state. Such an assertion, however, is subject to qualification when one considers the 
disparity in economic power among the contracting states.430 It is indeed a persuasive 
conclusion since, when one considers investment treaties, it is apparent that “the investment 
regime is built on “horizontal disequilibria among states that are supposed to be sovereign 
equals.”431 
By virtue of some BIT provisions, private parties in need of arbitration have been placed on a 
relatively favourable pedestal, an almost equal footing with the contracting state party.432 
The possibility for arbitration has opened up doors for litigation by these private economic 
interest groups against states.433 While the former scenario always placed every contract 
within the jurisdiction of a particular state, the prospect of arbitration before a neutral tribunal 
removes the veil of sovereignty that once shielded states from litigation.434 Arbitration is 
surely ‘denationalised’ in that “national law is entirely excluded and state parties are obliged 
to comply with the award of the tribunal, subject only to the provisions for appeal to an 
Annulment Committee.”435 
 
5.3 BITS, FTAS AND THE RESTRICTION OF POLICY SPACE 
In chapter 4, this study considered the numerous factors that constrain monetary 
sovereignty. Those constraints have numerous and varied implications to international 
economic law. The powers of the state to control the inflows and outflows of capital across 
its national borders, to determine the exchange rate between its currency and the currencies 
of other states, are the attributes of monetary sovereignty normally affected by the 
constraints. By signing a treaty, a state may severely restrict its legislative powers,436 
constrain its policy space and put itself in a very difficult position should there arise a need to 
correct its balance of payments disequilibrium. Meanwhile, exercising the state’s power to 
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determine the exchange rate may in certain circumstances be viewed as a form of currency 
manipulation.437 
The implications of the constraints may raise questions of democratic legitimacy438 among 
others while locking up the state’s policy space may frustrate any room for manoeuvre, 
giving rise to national resistance.439 The operative bias of the constraints against the national 
developmental goals and in favour of large corporates440 is an issue of critical concern 
particularly among the less developed countries. 
As discussed in the previous chapter of this study, there are certain sovereignty saving 
measures that bring moderation to the adverse effects of the juridical constraints. It is, 
however, plausible to state that the effects of these measures tend to be mostly modest and 
insufficient to mitigate the results of the international law encroachments on national 
economies. It is arguable that the predominance of market fundamentalism,441 expressing its 
sway through multilateral trade and investment agreements is excessively restrictive of 
national sovereignty and is a great compromise to developmental goals. The Seattle 
demonstrations of 1999442 sent a clear message of scepticism towards economic 
globalisation and all its ramifications. As a result, the orientation of the Doha Development 
Agenda,443 towards a development agenda was an acknowledgement of the limitations of 
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the previous rounds’ effectiveness in addressing the states’ obligations towards their 
constituencies. It was an unequivocal declaration that the benefits of trade do not 
necessarily deserve greater legal protection than development. 
It is apposite at this juncture to further to explore the effects of trade and investment 
agreements on the less developed countries in the context of economic theory. On 31 
January 2011, a group of economists wrote a letter to the US Secretary of State, Hillary 
Rodham Clinton as well as Timothy Geithner, the US Treasury Secretary and Ambassador 
Ron Kirk of the Office of the United States Trade Representative.444 They expressed their 
concerns on how the US trade Agreements were negatively affecting the US trading 
partners. The group of prominent economists, including Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, 
Joseph Stiglitz, Arvind Subramanian among others, argued that the terms of the US Trade 
Agreements were unduly restrictive on its trading partners and “that capital management 
techniques should be included among the “carefully designed macro-prudential measures” 
…“445 to deal with any unforeseen economic instability. They also noted that, under the 
“agreements, private foreign investors have the power to effectively sue governments in 
international tribunals over alleged violations of these provisions.”446 Such provisions strictly 
limit the powers of the trading partners to effectively deploy policy tools and to correct any 
macro-economic maladies. 
As can be discerned from the arguments presented by the economists, the BITs and FTAs 
have the effect of severely restricting the states’ policy space. Investors, most of whom are 
large corporates, are usually granted rights to sue the host states in order to enforce 
monetary provisions, notwithstanding the detrimental effects this might have on the overall 
welfare of the state.447 The restriction on the use of capital controls exposes the states to 
volatile capital flows and strips them of the means to “stem the development of dangerous 
asset bubbles and currency appreciations…”448 
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This danger for Free Trade Agreements and BITs to foreclose governments’ regulatory 
capacity has been expressed by Kelsey who correctly observes that through these treaties, 
states sometimes bind themselves to “obligations that could heighten financial instability and 
prevent governments from taking appropriate pre-emptive or remedial action in relation to 
future crises.”449 What gives the risk of litigation a higher likelihood is the fact that these 
treaties provide room for investors to litigate directly. They do not necessarily have to rely on 
their states to litigate on their behalf or to protect them through invoking diplomatic 
protection. They can do it without state assistance.450 
The response by the US Treasury office, represented by Timothy F. Geithner, however was 
a blatant attempt to downplay the adverse effects of the restrictions cited in the economists’ 
letter. The US Treasury office argued that the risks which accompany swings and surges in 
capital flows “are best managed through a mix of fiscal and monetary measures, exchange 
rate adjustments, and carefully designed non-discriminatory prudential measures, such as 
bank reserve or capital requirement and limitations on exposure to exchange risks.”451 Such 
a response fell far short of appreciating the effects of the restrictions on the other states and 
instead sounded more as a partisan expression of a stereotyped political position than a 
communication of economic rationale.  
The issues raised by the economists in their letter have been highlighted by the events in 
Argentina following the economic crisis that began in 1999 and spilled over into the 2000s. 
The story of Argentina is a distinct case study illustrating how far treaty clauses can limit 
state sovereignty. When the state faced a crippling economic crisis characterised by 
massive and violent street protests, it declared a state of emergency and “eliminated parity 
between the US Dollar and the Peso.”452 The adoption of the corrective monetary measures 
triggered a series of arbitral disputes by several foreign investors.453 
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The crisis exerted enormous pressure on the monetary system of the country to the extent 
that the state was compelled to adopt emergency monetary measures to redress the 
situation. However, the consequences of these measures were detrimental to the interests of 
several foreign investors,454 who being aggrieved by the measures, relied on BIT terms and 
launched claims for the recovery of financial loses allegedly suffered due to the state’s 
action. An act that could, in terms of customary international law, be viewed as an 
unchallengeable ‘act of state’455 had been turned into a subject of arbitration before a 
tribunal. Investors opted for arbitration under the ICSID and UNICITRAL rules mostly on the 
basis of the Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Argentina Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment of 1991, (hereafter called the US-
Argentina BIT.)456 The series of arbitration cases showed the extent to which the contracting 
states’ policy space had been narrowed by the BITs to which the state was a signatory. 
The CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina457 arbitral case was based on the United 
States -Argentina BIT of 1991 and was dealt with in terms of the ICSID arbitration rules while 
the National Grid plc v. Argentina458 arbitral case was based on the UK-Argentina BIT459 and 
was handled in terms of the UNICITRAL arbitration rules. Other notable cases include LG&E 
Energy Corporation, LG&E Capital Corporation, LG&E International Inc. v The Argentine 
Republic (2006-2007) also handled by the ICSID. The AWG Group v The Argentine 
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Republic460 case was handled in terms of UNICITRAL rules. Apparently, the claims against 
Argentina have numbered more than forty and have been, to say the least, overwhelming for 
the state.461 
While defending its decision to adopt the emergency measures, the state of Argentina 
argued that the measures were necessary under the circumstances. It was argued on behalf 
of the state that the suspension of foreign currency payments, the abandonment of the 
currency peg of the Peso to the US Dollar and the decision to effect all payments in local 
currency were the only options open to the state at the time of the crisis and that the states’ 
conduct was actuated by necessity. It was argued that the ‘Emergency Law,’ passed was 
“intended to cure, through realistic measures, the existing state of necessity.”462  
Investors challenged Argentina’s actions on the basis of a breach of the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET) standard. It was argued that the state had expropriated the properties of 
the foreign investors and had also discriminated against some of them.463 While the tribunal 
found Argentina to have breached the FET standard and the state’s conduct to have been 
discriminatory, the same could not be said in connection with expropriation.464 In some 
instances, tribunals upheld the defence of ‘necessity’ as sufficient to excuse the conduct of 
Argentina under the circumstances.465 
It would be appropriate in certain circumstances to assess the conduct of the state in terms 
of whether there could have been any least restrictive alternatives that could serve the 
purpose. Other considerations would include the “proportionality and the ‘reasonable nexus 
to rational government policies’.466  
 For the cases based on the US-Argentina BIT, the basis for the defence of necessity was 
Article XI,467 read in conjunction with Article 25468 of the International Law Commission 
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Articles of State Responsibility.469 In most of the cases, the defence was viewed as 
insufficient to exclude compensation by the state for the losses suffered by the investors. In 
the case of the Continental Casualty v Argentine Republic Award470 the tribunal upheld the 
defence of necessity just as the case of CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine471 
had also determined.472 Owing to the fact that the necessity was of a temporary nature 
however, its existence with respect to Argentina did not exclude compensation.473 The 
Annulment Committee said; 
“Article XI, if and for so long as it applied, excluded the operation of the 
substantive provisions of the BIT. That being so, there could be no possibility of 
compensation being payable during that period.”474 
The jurisprudence of the Argentine cases has revealed the limitations of the defence of 
necessity in cases of the BIT law and has highlighted the extent to which states should 
exercise caution when drawing as well as signing BITs. Remarkably, the Sempra v. 
Argentina Annulment Committee was more sympathetic to the state’s argument and would 
have readily accepted its defence of necessity.475 Evidently, the state of Argentina had 
bound itself to such proportions that its employment of corrective measures had become 
subject to limitations under the US-Argentine as well as the UK-Argentine BITs. In the 
absence of the defence of necessity, sovereignty is severely constrained and the potential 
detriment to governance is evidently high. Viterbo notes that:  
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“A host State hit by an economic crisis may essentially rely on two lines of 
defence: the customary law principle of ‘state of necessity’ and the exercise of 
monetary sovereignty.”476 
The writer however laments the fact that “the Argentinian cases showed the 
uncertainties connected with these legal arguments.”477 It is noteworthy however, that 
the doctrine of necessity is an accepted theory which can be applied in respect of 
treaty provisions.478 
As far as the question whether or not the investment decisions imposed ‘excessive’ 
restrictions on Argentina’s regulatory authority, Binder writes as follows; 
“In the result, Argentina was left with very little room for measures to remedy its 
economic crisis situation. The Argentine decisions may thus also be read as 
‘excessive’ or inappropriate restrictions of a state’s regulatory authority in the face 
economic / financial emergencies.”479 
The above quote aptly bolsters the argument in favour of reserving more sovereign powers 
to the state during treaty formulation. A reading of some of the cases such as the Sempra v. 
Argentina480 and the Enron v. Argentina481 does attest to the fact that some of the decisions 
were overly investor oriented482 and severely compromising of non-trade values instead of 
seeking a balance of the two.483 Granted the prospect of severely restricting policy space by 
treaty, states may have to deeply consider the terms before concluding a treaty. One of the 
criticisms against the investor-state tribunals is that they “have rarely balanced host states’ 
rights and duties to regulate in the public interest against investors’ rights when interpreting 
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an IIA.”484 As can be discerned from the outcomes of the investor-state tribunals, and with 
the benefit of the hindsight, most BITs were silent on the duty of the state to regulate and 
this was in keeping with the prevailing neoliberal ideas at the time of their formulation.485 
Investment promotion and protection were topmost in the minds of those that crafted 
them.486 Sovereignty was offered as a sacrifice, perceived as a lesser good. 
 
5.4 RETENTION OF GREATER SOVEREIGNTY: CALLS AND CLAMOURS 
Concern has been raised with regards to the patterns in arbitration decisions.487 The scale 
seems to be tilted in favour of the developed countries while the less developed countries 
find themselves having to defend their conduct before investor-state tribunals. According to 
an UNCTAD Report, 164 arbitral cases were initiated in the year 2009 alone. A majority of 
these cases were “initiated by investors from developed countries, with developing and 
transition countries most often on the receiving end.”488 This is hardly surprising when one 
considers that the BITs which form the legal basis of the cases were concluded at the time 
when the rich countries dominated the international law making process. This explains why 
there were glaring “inconsistencies and lack of coherence between arbitral decisions.”489 
The skewed pattern of the decisions in favour of the corporates explains the connection 
between law making process and their ability to lobby for the protection of their interests. 
The influence of corporates in moulding opinions cannot be denied when one considers that 
some of them, particularly in the developed countries, have higher annual incomes than the 
GDPs of most nations.490 By virtue of unlimited financial capacity, Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) can surely articulate their interests to the point of getting them 
entrenched in BITs, FTAs as well as multilateral legal regimes.491 Such corporate agendas 
are disguised behind the state negotiators so as to gain a semblance of legitimacy.492 It is no 
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wonder that the Doha Round emphasised a development agenda instead of the theme of 
trade liberalism which had dominated the previous trade rounds.493 
The emphasis on trade liberalism, a characteristic element of ‘corporate capitalism’, and of 
‘neoliberalism’ lost appeal towards the end of the 20th Century. The ideas that shaped the 
‘Washington Consensus’494 met stiff resistance as illustrated by the demonstrations of 
Seattle. The aftermath of the demonstrations saw the launch of the Doha Development 
Agenda. There was evidently a significant break with the traditions of the previous 
multilateral trade rounds. This fact was well captured  by McGuirk who wrote that;  
“The launch of a new trade round in Doha last November was a major 
breakthrough following the debacle in Seattle in 1999. The new round places the 
needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of its work, but a 
successful outcome for rich and poor nations alike is by no means a foregone 
conclusion.”495 
Yet, the Doha Round also got into a kind of inertia at some point resulting in calls for its 
revitalisation through the adoption of exchange rate determination as one of the key areas 
on its table.496 It is equally important to realise that the Doha Round is characterised by an 
absence of ‘private sector’ interests that had dominated the previous rounds.497 Market 
access as provided through GATS commitments had tended to favour “private sector’ 
interests but events following the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference tilted the scale in favour 
of the weaker sovereigns. 
Even if that is the case, it is regrettable that international investment has not received as 
much attention as ideally should be the case following the adoption of the so-called 
Singapore Issues at WTO Ministerial conference498 in 1996. The Singapore issues were 
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adopted as part of the Doha round in 2001 but their discussion came to a halt at the 
Ministerial Conference of Cancún, in 2003499 following a deadlock over them.500 Efforts to 
bring investment issues to the forefront of multilateral discussions came to a limbo following 
the collapse of the Cancún conference. 
5.5 CURRENCY MANIPULATIONS, DOLLARISATION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS TO 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
The power of a state to determine its exchange arrangement is an integral aspect of 
statehood.501 In terms of Article IV of the IMF, 
“Each member shall notify the Fund … of the exchange arrangements it intends 
to apply in fulfilment of its obligations … and shall notify the Fund promptly of any 
changes in its exchange arrangements.”502   
This precisely leaves every state with the freedom to decide its own exchange 
arrangements. A complaint against a state’s exercise of this right is, at face value, an 
untenable affront to the principle of sovereignty. Yet the subject of ‘currency manipulation’ 
has in recent years been a topical matter particularly in connection with a monetary dispute 
involving the USA and China.503 The matter has drawn the attention of international jurists in 
recent years,504 generating a huge academic conversation on the legitimacy of China’s 
currency peg of the Yuan505 to the US Dollar. 
Beginning from 1997, China maintained a currency peg at a rate of RMB 8.28: US1.00.506 
The initial purpose of the peg507 was to stabilise the financial system at a time when the 
East-Asian Countries were experiencing an economic crisis. Countries such as Malaysia 
experienced capital flight and to curb the challenges, they introduced numerous monetary 
                                            
499
 This was a conference convened to map a way forward on matters of investment, government 
procurement, trade facilitation and competition policy. Refer to Fergusson I supra at 3. 
500
 Fergusson IF supra at 20. 
501
 Chapter 3, paragraph 3.4.4. of this study. 
502
 Article IV (2)a of the IMF. 
503
 Proctor C Mann on the Legal aspect of Money 7
th
 Edition 2012 at 605. 
504
 De Lima-Campo A & Gil JAG “A Case for Misaligned Currencies as Countervailable subsidies” in 
UNCTAD XIII Pre-Conference Event Policy Dialogue: Redefining the Role of the Government in 
Tomorrow’s International Trade 26 – 27 March 2012 Room XVI, Palais des Nations, Geneva.  
505
  Staiger RW & Sykes AO ‘Currency Manipulation and World Trade” (2010) (9) (4) World Trade 
Review at 583-627. See also Proctor C supra at 604-6010. Ahn D “Is the Chinese exchange-rate 
regime "WTO-legal"?” in Evenett Simon J (ed) The US-Sino Currency Dispute: New Insights from 
Economics, A VoxEU.org Report  2010  at 139-145. 
506
 Proctor C supra at 605. 
507
 Proctor C supra at 596 defines  a monetary peg as fixing the value of one currency in terms of 
another currency. 
93 
 
University of South Africa 2015 
measures.508 China also adopted the peg as one of the monetary measures to contain the 
crisis. As the years progressed, however, US industrialists began to complain that the 
‘undervalue’ status of the Yuan was acting as an export subsidy granting an unfair 
advantage to Chinese exports while serving as an import tax509 on imports into China.510 At 
the height of the East Asia crisis, China’s economy remained steadfastly stable due to the 
peg that insulated the currency from volatile fluctuations.511 
While the pegging of the Yuan against the US dollar may at face value appear to be adverse 
to US interests, it is nevertheless a legitimate exercise of sovereignty permitted in law. This 
fact is particularly well noted by Ahn who states that “Pegging an exchange rate to other key 
currency is not per se illegal nor irrational.”512 A question arises therefore in terms of where 
to draw the line between a legitimate exercise of monetary sovereignty and a violation of a 
state’s obligations in terms of bilateral as well as multilateral legal regimes. 
Yet, even in spite of its clear benefits to the Republic of China, the use of the peg remains 
highly contested in international law.513 Remarkably, while all eyes have focused on the 
Republic of China which has been cited as a prime epitome of currency manipulation, it is 
not the only state to engage in it.514 Many other states do intervene in the currency market to 
stabilise their economies.515 In spite of there being a credible argument to justify the use of a 
currency peg,516 it would appear that China’s conduct has gone far enough to cross the line 
of reasonable exercise of sovereignty.517 
The search for a suitable way to deal with state interventions in the currency markets is still 
on. Suggestions point towards customary international law as well as treaty law. However, 
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as Proctor asserts, customary international law does not offer grounds upon which a 
currency peg arrangement can be impugned.518 In spite of that fact, a fixed peg, although 
perfectly consistent with the China’s obligations in terms of Article IV(2), could be viewed as 
a violation of the Article XV(4) of the GATT.519 If it could be proved to be both an export 
subsidy and an import charge, then it could be subject to a challenge in terms of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).520 Providing the proof is one 
of those colossal burdens upon the one who alleges that the peg is assailable in terms of the 
WTO law. The precise criteria to determine a currency manipulation is not straight forward. It 
is however, reasonable to argue that protracted periods of undervalued status may be 
challenged on the basis of the ASCM. Arguably, short-term undervaluations are not likely to 
adversely affect other states as much as long-term undervaluations would.521 
The WTO is, however, not adequately equipped to handle the manipulations, thereby 
making it difficult to apply the ASCM to deal with the problem.522 Article XV of the GATT 
does not refer expressly to currency manipulations but vaguely refers to “exchange action” 
and “trade action”.523 To stretch its application to cover currency manipulations would be to 
out-rightly shoehorn the argument. Proctor remarks convincingly that “it therefore seems 
unlikely that China’s currency peg infringes the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.”524 
Competitive devaluations are not new to international law.525 But why have grievances 
regarding currency manipulations just taken centre stage in recent years and not before?  To 
hazard an answer, one needs to take cognisance of the fact that at the formulation of GATT 
rules in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the par value system still held 
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sway and the prospects of manipulation were not a threat to economic relations.526 
Considering that the WTO system was not designed to regulate and pass verdicts on 
matters of the exchange rate, it is inconceivable how its dispute mechanisms can be of any 
help with regards to currency manipulations.527  Some of the matters being brought before 
the WTO were initially meant to be handled by the IMF. Admittedly however, a look at the 
complimentary roles of the two institutions reveals that their jurisdictional boundaries are not 
cast in stone.528 
While its prospects of success may seem remote and fanciful, the application of the ASCM 
measures is still open to the WTO members. In the absence of proper mechanisms to 
redress the challenge, states would resort to retaliatory529 measures which would only serve 
to hurt rather than enhance the economic interaction among the nations. In cases where 
countervailing measures are applied, the cost of maintaining an undervalued currency is “the 
right that other WTO Members have to impose countervailing duties to their exports.”530 
Punitive retaliations would be the closest remedy available to the agrieved states. 
Another matter of great significance in international monetary law is the concept of 
‘dollarisation.’ While a state is free to adopt the currency of another and to use it as its own, 
a process known as ‘dollarisation’, it is noteworthy that the state issuing the currency is not 
completely without a voice regarding the matter.531 The European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB)532 requires a state that expresses an interest to adopt the Euro as its currency to first 
obtain the consent of the ESCB533 and must meet certain minimum conditions so as not to 
jeopardise the functioning of the currency system. This requirement seems reasonable since 
the use of one state’s currency by another definitely has monetary policy implications on the 
economy of the issuing state. Problems of fiscal indiscipline in the state that adopts 
another’s currency will no doubt affect the issuing state in an adverse way. Although its 
currency has been adopted by a number of states534 in a process of dollarisation, the USA 
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takes a less stringent approach in that it does not directly monitor the states that use its 
currency.535 The fact that a state that dollarizes can freely swing to and fro between the 
monetary systems, freely re-instituting its currency at will,536 props the argument that 
dollarization needs to be subject to some degree of regulation particularly by the state 
issuing the xeno-currency. This is necessary so as to strike a balance between the needs of 
the issuing state and the needs of the state that adopts the currency of another. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
A review of the issues discussed in this chapter raises serious questions about the 
legitimacy of the constraints on sovereignty. The fact that a state’s power to employ 
corrective measures can be a subject of legal challenges before tribunals even when the 
state is faced with imminent collapse and a crippling economic situation places the state in 
an unenviable position. A salient policy question regards how a state’s commitment to a 
stable monetary system based either on exchange controls or fixed exchange rate 
arrangements can be reconciled to the duty to exercise its monetary powers without hurting 
other states. The contestations regarding Chinese monetary policy537 highlight the extent to 
which national boundaries will no longer provide an effective veil of protection for national 
policies. 
Without doubt, the foregoing discussion reveals that the policy options available to states 
have been strictly circumscribed through the signing of multilateral and bilateral treaties. The 
state can no longer “eat its cake and still have it.” States will have to exercise a great deal of 
caution not to violate the promises and obligations they have pledged to other international 
law subjects.538 Indeed, monetary sovereignty is subject to numerous constraints and the 
implications of these constraints are significant both for the creditor and debtor states. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having considered the scope of monetary sovereignty, the challenges associated with its 
application as well as the implications of its limitations to international economic law, it is 
appropriate at this point to make a summary of the main observations made by the study as 
well to make recommendations regarding how to handle the divergent interests of the 
various international legal persons. The legal rights and obligations of states, investors and 
traders sometimes clash openly in as far as monetary sovereignty is concerned.539 Each of 
the interest groups has some vested interests the protection of which lies at the heart of 
international monetary law. As the last chapter of the study, it is appropriate that the chapter 
wraps up the discussion by presenting recommendations. 
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND FINDINGS 
The first five chapters dealt with the theoretical issues regarding monetary sovereignty. 
Firstly, the study identified the problems regarding the regulation of monetary matters in 
international law. It observed that the ubiquitous nature of cross-border commercial activities 
has made the need for coordinated monetary regulation an ever present challenge. National 
economies have become so closely integrated that inter-state co-operation has become an 
inescapable necessity. Among some of the most salient concerns is the manipulation of 
municipal monetary systems540 by state functionaries in order to gain advantage over other 
states.  
Owing to the fact that it is the duty of the state to ensure economic stability, the second 
chapter considered the role of the state in the conduct of monetary law. The subject of cross-
border capital movements in response to the emerging global financial markets remains 
highly significant. The study revealed the changing role of the state within the international 
law framework and how it now plays an intermediary541 role between the needs of its 
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citizenry and the needs of the international community. The emergent paradigms of 
international monetary regulation542 were also highlighted in the context of how multiple 
functional centres interact in a manner that is so distinct and different from the erstwhile 
patterns in terms of which functional areas were neatly demarcated. The participation of 
“international organizations, multinational corporations, regions, local communities and the 
civil society”543 in the exercise of monetary regulation has resulted in a diffusion of 
sovereignty much because of the centripetal and centrifugal forces acting against it.544 
The third chapter focused on the scope and incidences of monetary sovereignty in the 
context of the need to deploy appropriate corrective measures while the state carries out 
macro-economic regulatory functions. It was highlighted that states periodically invoke 
sovereignty in order to correct disorders affecting national economies.545 The numerous 
attributes of sovereignty were highlighted with much elaboration, delineating the scope of the 
operation of the state where traditional notions are still in operation. An acknowledgement of 
the dynamic nature of international law however highlights the extent to which states 
currently remain with residual sovereignty.546 A proper understanding of the normative547 and 
positive attributes of sovereignty is useful to the extent that it contextualizes the power of the 
state at an appropriate locus within the time spectrum. While the normative attributes 
illuminate what sovereignty should mean both in conceptualisation and application, its 
positive attributes encapsulate what actual rights, duties and rules to look for when applying 
the concept of sovereignty to a particular legal problem.548 
Proctor aptly captures the positive attributes of monetary sovereignty when he writes that: 
“The municipal legislator is free to define the currency of his country, to decide 
whether or not it should be pegged to another currency, to determine the means 
by which monetary and exchange rate policies are to be defined and 
implemented, to devalue or revalue the currency, to allow or prohibit the use of 
foreign currencies within its borders, to impose exchange controls, or to take 
other measures affecting monetary relations.”549 
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In the absence of any constraining factors, the positive attributes of sovereignty give the 
concept such a wide scope that state powers as against external entities would be almost 
totalitarian. For this reason, the juridical constraints operating against unlimited sovereignty 
were the focus of the fourth chapter. 
The chapter identified the constraints within the framework of an inter-play between national 
and international interests. One of the conspicuous observations is that monetary 
sovereignty still occupies an important part of international economic relations.550 The reality 
of its severe curtailment through the application of customary law principles as well as treaty 
provisions is however strongly admitted.551 The operative effect of treaties is particularly 
outstanding so much as the different treaty regimes spell out some boundaries of state 
power previously unknown in terms of customary international law. The constraint on the 
power of the state to impose current payments restrictions is a novelty that was introduced 
by treaty provisions.552 
States have seriously curtailed their monetary sovereignty through participation in 
multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the WTO. Their powers have also been 
significantly narrowed in this regard by the conclusion of BITs and other International 
Investment Agreements (IIA). The effects of the IMF provisions such as Article VIII (2), 
dealing with international current transactions and Article VI dealing with capital transactions 
are to say the least exacting. While the latter leaves the states with great latitude in dealing 
with capital transactions, the controversy as regards transfer of capital remains topical.553 
Meanwhile, the GATT regime does not directly limit the rights of states to maintain capital 
controls. Instead, the use of controls is subject to the IMF regime as well as commitments 
negotiated in terms of the GATS Agreement.554 There is an important provision within the 
GATT Agreement which provides a vital bridge between the IMF and the WTO legal 
regimes.555 Article XV (4) provides a neat tie between the two systems by stating that; 
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“Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the 
provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of 
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.”556 
The complimentary functions of the two systems are vividly expressed in the legal text in a 
way that reveals how the different institutions of international law function in such a way as 
to attain the same goals.557 The WTO system also limits sovereignty through the application 
of schedules of commitments in terms of Article XI of the GATS. Since the schedules are 
drawn through the negotiations voluntarily undertaken by each individual state, the 
constraints are not externally imposed by the WTO on the member. Each contracting party 
to the GATS agreement voluntarily assumes them. The liberalisation of the monetary 
transfers and payments regarding trade in goods and services has been achieved through 
these multilateral regimes. Due to the ever increasing significance of foreign direct 
investment558 as well as short term investments, it has progressively become difficult to 
discuss the limitations of sovereignty without reference to investment law.  
The protection of investment is subject to BITs and IIAs and though the liberalisation 
provisions apply as between the state parties concerned, their effects tend to be drastic. The 
IMF system, unlike BITs and IIAs, is indeed modest in its constraints on monetary 
sovereignty.559 
While the argument in favour of capital account liberalisation used to be stronger than the 
argument against it, there has been a significant shift with regards to the burden of proof, 
from the anti-liberalisation to the pro-liberalisation camp.560 The anti-liberalisation camp has 
revealed the vast differences that exist between the natures of current and capital 
transactions.561 The East-Asia crisis of 1997-1998, the crisis in Argentina at the beginning of 
this millennium as well the global crisis that began at 2007562 are some of the events that 
have clearly highlighted the need for the deployment of capital controls in stabilising the 
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monetary system. They also illustrate the ongoing relevance of capital controls as a 
significant corrective measure. Moreover, the prevailing debate563 among economic theorists 
regarding the benefits of capital account liberalisation render it too risky to call for 
unrestricted liberalisation of capital flows. 
As such, the legal position with regards to current account liberalisation is clear while the 
same is not true for the capital account. It is that asymmetry564 which creates uncertainty and 
for which a speedy resolution is requisite. One writer sums it up by saying; 
“For all of these reasons, the asymmetry in the IMF mandate over current and 
capital account issues should be overcome. This entails broadening the IMF 
competences on capital movements: the Fund should play a more active role not 
only overseeing capital flows through its bilateral and multilateral surveillance, but 
also establishing a multilateral code of good conduct on capital account 
liberalization.”565 
The fifth chapter gave an exposition of the implications of the juridical constraints to 
international economic law. It saw an application of the theoretical issues covered in the first 
four chapters to certain concrete situations so as to give an exposition of how restrictive 
treaty provisions apply in real dispute scenarios. 
This highlights the practical consequences of the constraints on sovereignty as well as the 
problems that emerge as a result of the legal developments. The BITs and multilateral 
regimes have caused a significantly notable impact in terms of limiting the policy space for 
the states.566 One of the effects is to limit the ability of the states to adjust their economies in 
the face of rigid terms imposed in terms of the legal regimes.567 Some BITs’  provisions have 
opened up floodgates of litigation against states through elaborate arbitration procedures.568 
Even though such procedures do not eliminate sovereignty, they do restrict it in a substantial 
way so as not to defeat legitimate claims by investors. To the extent that the priviledge of the 
state to raise a defence of sovereignty before a tribunal569 is limited, its powers will not be 
used to frustrate legitimate contractual claims. 
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6.3 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of monetary sovereignty still occupies a very important place in international 
law570 as states play an important function in monetary regulation. However, in their pursuit 
of national objectives they can no longer act in isolation.571 Their survival has become so 
entwined with that of others such that co-operation has become the mainstay of the exercise 
of power.572 As a result there has been a strengthening of international institutions geared 
towards the regulation of inter-state economic activities.573 However, the proliferation of 
arbitral prceedings in recent years has also altered the way states perceive their 
international law obligations. Some states have begun to revise574 or withdraw from IIAs and 
yet still others adopt clauses that limit the jurisdiction of the ICSID.575 Withdrawal and 
revision are two sides of the same coin, designed to achieve the same objectives. The idea 
is to enable the states to negotiate treaties for more favourable terms so as to allow them 
enough leeway to carry out their regulatory functions without fear of being hauled before 
arbitral tribunals.576 
The contours of monetary sovereignty have somehow shifted. Its attributes apply differently 
and even their level of curtailment is not the same. While state power remains unchallenged 
in respect of such aspects as the power to determine the name of the monetary unit, the 
monetary standard, the adoption of the currency of another state in a process of 
dollarisation, the power of the state is more restricted in respect of other attributes.577 As this 
study has revealed, the Republic of China’s right to peg its currency against the US Dollar  
has been a subject of great debate and scrutiny578 in spite of it being a clear exercise of 
monetary sovereignty. The subject of current account convertibility is regulated in terms of 
Article VIII(2)a of the IMF which clearly states that a member state requires the approval of 
the IMF before it can impose restrictions on current transactions. Meanwhile the regulation of 
capital movements is not as strictly harmonized as that of the current transactions. The 
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regulatory asymmetry579 between current and capital accounts creates uncertainties for 
economic actors. Currency manipulations are a kind of a thorn in the flesh for international 
monetary law. Neither the IMF nor the WTO system are sufficiently designed to single 
handledly deal with currency manipulation disputes.  
The distinction between private and public international law is somehow getting blurred as 
more and more private parties are taking to arbitration tribunals580 without having to rely on 
their home countries581 to pursue the cases on their behalf. Arbitration tribunals are being 
convened in terms of UNICITRAL rules, ICSID rules or the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce rules. With some of the investment treaties582 being 
heavily oriented towards a greater protection of investors at the expense of citizens, it has 
become increasingly important for states to carefully weigh the benefits of the treaties 
against the cost to national sovereignty.583 
In summary, the study identified problems such as the inordinate protection of investments 
which in some cases leads to a harassment of states by the investors taking advantage of 
investor friendly bilateral and free trade agreements. The problem is further compounded by 
a lack of an general international investment agreement to harmonise the terms and 
conditions for the acceptance of direct foreign investment.584 Problems such as the 
‘catastrophic collapse’585 of currencies also do occur from time to time with devastating 
effects. There is also an issue of currency manipulations by some states while asymmetric 
regulatory regimes for current and capital transactions pose a serious challenge to the 
liberalisation of the economic space. It is in light of these observations that the next segment 
makes recommendations for dealing with the problems identified. 
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6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Capital importing states, which have been harassed by massive investment claims586  such 
as Argentina, should consider re-negotiating the investment agreements so to avoid 
continued exposure to risk of litigation by foreign investors at the expense of the protection 
of the state. To the extent that states end up with restricted policy space due to restrictive 
agreements, it is imperative to revise the treaties so as to moderate those terms that are 
unfriendly to the pursuit of essential state duties.587 A level playing field is requisite in 
international monetary law so that the interests of less developed states are protected from 
domination by large corporate interests expressing themselves through the powerful political 
voices of the developed capital exporting countries. The revision of treaties can lead to an 
adoption of techniques ranging from exception clauses,588 interpretative clauses,589 as well 
as preambular language590 that incorporates other treaty objectives besides the protection 
and promotion of investments.591 Revising the terms of the treaties will strike a balance 
between the interests of foreign investors and the regulatory duties of the  sovereign states. 
Considering the decline in the popularity of the ‘Calvo doctrine’592, the mention of which is in 
itself superflous, it nevertheless remains appropriate to state that it was an effective device 
to guarantee the rights of the foreign traders without necessarily restricting the sovereignty of 
the host states. The arguments made against its application have, however, been so strong 
as to lead to its total rejection in the crafting of international agreements.593 The US-
Argentine BIT clearly excluded the ‘Calvo doctrine’ and that was a major milestone for 
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international investment law.594 Its exclusion therefore marked a departure from an 
established norm associated with Latin America. 
It is imperative therefore for states to exercise more caution when signing BITs and other 
FTAs by avoiding treaty clauses that might bind them to the point of frustrating their power to 
adopt corrective measures in time of crippling economic crisis.595 Treaty clauses which 
restrict the ability of the states to adjust their economic situations through the use of capital 
controls, alteration of parity between currencies, the imposition of restrictions on current 
payments among others are restrictive of the exercise of sovereignty. In recent years, there 
has been a growing tendency to include other objectives besides the protection of 
investments. Sustainable development has come up as one of those objectives being 
protected by the treaties.596 
An imminent need for a favourable multilateral investment treaty was noted in the late 1990s 
but the collapse of the OECD sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI)  in 
1998597 dealt a heavy blow to the initiative of creating an institution with global jurisdiction on 
matters of foreign direct investment. Yet, in light of the discrepancies among countries as 
regards the applicable investment treatment standards, it may be necessary to revisit the 
idea of such an organisation with the idea of bringing about uniformity598 while at the same 
time ensuring greater latitude of policy space for the sovereigns concerned. 
Since it is possible for the currency of a state to collapse with ‘catastrophic’ effects, and 
there being no international law duty for the debtor state to revalorise its money, contracting 
parties need to adopt value maintenance clauses while negotiating treaties.599 A state that 
fails to negotiate for such clauses practically assumes the risks associated with the 
catastrophic depreciation of the currency of the other contracting party.600 It is arguably 
logical that cases of catastrophic devaluations, in cases where states are debtors, should be 
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distinguished from those where they are not. More accountability must be demanded in 
cases where the state is a debtor, and more so where bad faith601 can be inferred.  
With regards to exchange rate and currency manipulations, in light of the attendant 
weaknesses of the IMF and the GATT in dealing with the challenges, it seems a plausible 
alternative to strengthen the collaborative functions between the two global institutions.602 
While the idea of creating another institution altogether may seem reasonable, it is the 
sustained proposition of this study that a proliferation of institutions is not necessarily to be 
desired. Rather, an amendment to Article XV(4) of the GATT so as to equip it with more 
competencies in unambiguous terms will enable the organisation to effectively deal with the 
currency manipulations.603 It is equally important to remember, however, that the 
amendments need to take cognisance of the role of the IMF so as to avoid a takeover of the 
IMF jurisdiction by the WTO. 
The tribunals that have been instrumental in carrying out arbitral functions have been subject 
to a great deal of denunciation.604 They are mostly ad hoc in nature.605 Initially, they were 
meant to serve private interests and their adequacy in dealing with issues that touch upon 
the sovereign prerogatives of nations is itself a highly controversial matter. There is great 
merit in the argument that: 
“Vesting investor-state tribunals with the power to consider states’ non-
investment policy objectives and to balance them against states’ investment 
policy objectives will place great responsibility on arbitrators to refine the 
substantive standards in IIAs and to pass judgment on host-states’ public policy 
measures.”606 
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In the absence of an appellate body, the arbitral system leaves a lot to be desired.  It is to be 
admitted though that institutions such as the Annulment Committee607 of the ICSID do play a 
balancing role as far as procedural matters are concerned. It is appropriate at this point to 
sound a reminder that the procedural matters regarding the arbitral institutions are outside 
the scope of this study and as such it suffices to mention that the system has had a great 
impact on the way monetary obligations are viewed within the BIT system. 
It is important for the quasi-judicial institutions interpreting the monetary and other 
international treaty provisions to take deference towards the sovereign duty to regulate.608 It 
is of critical importance to apply judicial deference so as to reconcile the demands of 
investors with the expectations of national law.609 It is equally important to balance the 
principle of ‘deference’610 with the doctrine of ‘effectiveness’ which protects the objectives of 
a treaty from being defeated due to an unfriendly interpretations.611 The application of 
deference is necessitated by the need to balance the competing interests as Petersmann 
argues:  
“The legitimate diversity and competing conceptions of ‘principles of justice’ 
justify judicial deference via-a`-vis diverse conceptions of human rights, economic 
cosmopolitan rights, corresponding ‘duties to protect’ and ‘corporate 
responsibilities’ as relevant context for interpreting IEL.”612 
Having observed the need for balancing the interests of investors with the regulatory duties 
of the state, an element which has been missing in most arbitral cases, it is imperative for 
tribunals to show a greater level of deference towards state interests.  As far as deference is 
concerned, Henckels says: 
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“Investment tribunals should be more deferential in performing proportionality 
analysis, mindful of host state authorities’ greater democratic legitimacy and 
proximity to host state communities, and tribunals’ comparatively weak 
institutional capacity.”613 
Deference, as an adjudicative tool complements other usefull devices such as the exception 
clauses, interpretive clauses as well as linguistic devices being used in the recently 
developed model treaties.614 The revision of the treaties, leading to an adoption of clauses 
that magnify other objectives besides the promotion and protection of investments certainly 
goes a long way in rehabilitating monetary sovereignty particularly in cases where BIT terms 
have caused so much erosion. 
In light of the issues raised in the foregoing discussion, a combination of tools and devices 
would be helpful in mitigating the effects of the juridical constraints on monetary sovereignty. 
A harmonisation of the global institutions and an adjustment of some of the previously 
popular approaches are necessary steps required to address the needs of states while at the 
same time protecting the monetary interests of the traders and investors.  
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